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IN 'rHE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2888 
CORRIE A. FULLE~, 
versus~ 
VIRGINIA TRUST COMP ANY, ETC., ET ALS. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court of .Appeals. of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Corrie A. Fuller, · represents unto your 
Honors that she is aggrieved by a decree entered in the above 
styled chancery cause by the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
on June 19., 1944, in which Virginia Trust Coinpany, 
2* Executor and Trustee under the Will of *Rawlev H. 
Fuller, was the complainant, and petitioner and Rawley 
H~ Fuller, Jr., Sarah F. Hudgins, William Allen Fuller, Mary 
Anne Fuller,· T. ·C. Watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs,· were de· 
fendants. · · · 
FACTS. 
Dr. Rawley H. Fuller died on July 24, 1943., a resident of 
South Boston, Virginia, where for many years he· had op-
erated the South Boston Hospital. He was survived by his 
widow, Corrie A. Fuller; Rawley H. Fuller, Jr., and Sarah 
F. Hudgins, children by a former marriage; William Allen 
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Fuller, a son by the said Corrie A. Fuller; and Mary Anne 
Fuller, an adopted infant daughter. 
At the time of his death Dr. Fuller was seised and possessed . 
of real estate used in the operation of his South Boston Hos-
pital, an undivided half interest in a farm near Clover, and 
a sizeable personal estate, all of which was disposed of by his 
last will and testament dated July 30, 1932, and probated on 
July 27, 1943. The bulk of his estate is bequeathed and 
devised in trust for the benefit of his wife and four children 
until his youngest child becomes twenty-one years of age, at 
which time the trust estate is directed to be divided equally 
among his children and his wife, her :share being dependent 
upon her living at the time. The Virginia Trust Company 
was named as Executor and Trustee under the will and quali-
fied as such on July 27, 1943, at which time it took possession 
of his estate, appraised at $111,466~62. 
On August 7, 1943, the South Boston Hospital,, including 
real estate and all equipment and personal property used 
in connection therewith, was sold by the Executor and Trus-
tee to T. C. ,vatkins, Jr., and L. K. Briggs at the price of 
$40,000. 
3• 41:Corrie A. Fuller, by her written renunciation dated 
Aug-ust 13, 1943, renounced the provisions made for her 
under her husband's will and -claimed her dower and distribu-
tive share in his estate. 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee, by its 
deed dated October 20, 1943, conveyed the South Boston Hos-
pital property to T. C. Watkins, Jr., and I. K. Brigg& 
William A. McCanless, Jr., :and wife, i.n their -deed of May 
19, 1938, conveyed certain residence property on Washington 
·Street irni South Boston to -Corrie A. Fuller at a stated ,oon-
sider-ation ,of $81iOO ·cash. It is ciaimed by Virg,inia 'ir:rnst 
Company, E:Kecutor and ·Tr.11stee, ·and T. C. Watkins, .Jr.~ and 
I. K . .Briggs, pnn.~chasers ,of the South Boston Hospittal prop-
erty, ,that the deed if;r,om William .A.. MeOanless, .Jr., i8nd wife 
fo <Jorde A.. Filillier 1oreated s:ta-tutocy joinbur.e .and 1ilnat hav-
·ing renounced the will 1olf Dr .. FuH:er, .her .residence rp11operty 
.reverts ito bis ,·estate and that .sbe is -only errtitlem. to domer 
therein. The undisputed evidence shows a cash payment of 
$8,500 to :McCanless, of which amount $2,500 was actually 
paid by Dr. Fuller at the :time 101:it of his own funds and of 
which amount $6.,000 was paid throng·h a loan on the property 
:evidenced ;bw the .noiin:t 11"0te of Coirrie A. Fu11ller :aud "Ra:wllev 
H. F,uller., pa_~a;b-le it11 manthly iinstal:lmenfa;.; wnd that ,after 
ithe ·delivery and :ueeor.dati@n of ,the dee:d ;and a£ter file ,eff:e.e-
,HiVle idaite ;0f itlbe .1!938 amendmem1 to ·:O@:de .~oti:on :512(i), Dr. 
tF,mUer :paid mh.ese moill!thly dmtstatllmems ·as they ibe.cmmne dne 
• 
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and payable until 1942, when he anticipated and paid in full 
the balance due on said loan. The uncontradicted testimony 
of three witnesses shows that the conveyance from ·wmiam 
A. McCanless, Jr., and wife to Corrie A. Fuller was made at 
the direction of Dr. Fuller as and for a birthday -present to 
her and that the deed was actually recorded on May 28, the 
date of her birth. 
4* *PROCEEDINGS. 
-
On August 19, 1943, after Virginia Trust Company, Execu-
tor and Trustee, had sold the South Boston Hospital prop-
erty but before a deed was made to the purchasers, and after 
Corrie A. Fuller had executed her written renunciation, she 
and the adult children of Dr. Fuller instituted a suit in the 
Oircuit Court of Halifax County against Virginia Trust Com-
pany, Executor and Trustee under the ·wm of Rawley H. 
fuller, and T. C. \Vatkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs, for the pur-
pose of rescinding the contract of sale1 enjoining the execu-
tion of a deed of conveyance in accordance with the terms of 
said contract, and removing .from office the Virginia Trust 
Company, Executor and Trustee aforesaid .. CorJ.'ie A .. Fuller 
tendered with the bill of complaint h_1 said suit a bona fide 
off er of $50,000 cash for the property sold for $40,000. A 
decree was entered in this suit on October 15, 1943., in which . 
the Trial Court refused to grant the relief as prayed and 
dismissed the bill without prejudice to the rights of Corrie 
A. Fuller to institute such·. proceedings as she may be advised 
are proper for the recovery and assignment of her dower in 
the real estate of which her husband. died ·seised and pos-
sessed, and without prejudice to the rights: of the Executor, 
or any other devisee, to institute such proceedings as they 
may be advised are right and proper in connection with their 
rig·hts in the real and personal estate of Rawley H. Fulle1• 
which had not been litigated and decided in said suit. A copy 
of said decree is filed as an exhibit on page 24 of the tran-
script of the record. 
-· On November 8, 1943, Corrie A. Fuller filed her bill against 
T. C. Watkins, Jr.," and I. K. Briggs for assignment of her 
· dower in ·accordance with C<;>de Section 5125, in the real 
5* estate conveyed to them *by Virginia Trust Company, 
Executor and Trustee, as a part of the South Boston Hos-
pital property. The defendants in this suit filed their answer 
alleging that Corrie A. Fuller bad elected to J10ld as jointure 
her residence property in South Boston and is the ref ore 
barred from dower in the South Boston Hospital real prop-
• 
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erty; that the Virginia Trust Company,, Executor and Trus-
tee, was fully authorized under the will to sell and convey 
complete title to the South Boston Hospital property, both 
real and personal, and that they had received a proper deed 
from it vesting in them a complete title, but that should Cor-
rie A. Fuller be allowed to surrender her jointure to the es-
tate and re-elect to take dower in the real estate of Dr. Fuller, 
that said dower should be assigned to her out of his real es-
tate other than the South Boston Hospital property, and they 
denied that the complainant was entitled to any relief what-
soever. . 
On December 22, 1943, the Virginia Trust Company, Execu-
tor and Trustee, instituted its suit against Corrie A. Fuller 
and others, in which an appeal is sought to the adverse de-
cree of June 21., 1944. In this suit the complainant charges, 
among other things, that the real estate conveyed by William 
A. McCanless, Jr., and wife to Corrie A. Fuller by deed dated 
May 19, 1938, was purchased by Rawley H. Fuller and that 
the entire consideration was paid by him from his own funds· 
and that Rawley H. Fuller caused the conveyance of said 
real estate to be made to his wife, Corrie A. Fuller, intend-
ing the same to be for her jointure and in lieu of her dower in 
his estate. A demurrer was filed by Corrie A. Fuller to said 
charge and allegation and after argument the Trial Court by 
a decree of April 25, 1944, overruled said demurrer. On the 
same date, upon motion of the complainant, Virginia Trust 
Company,, Executor and Trustee, and the defendants, T. C. 
·watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs, the Trial Court entered 
6• a decree in the suit of •corrie A. Fuller v. T. C. Watkins, 
Jr., l!nd I. K. Briggs for assignment of dower, ordering 
that the proceedings in said suit be stayed and that it be 
broug·ht on for hearing· with the aforesaid suit of Virginia 
Trust Company, Executor and Trustee v. Corrie A. Fuller, 
et als. The charge made by Virginia Trust Company, Execu-
tor and Trustee, in its said bill, that the McCanless property 
was conveyed~ to Corrie A. Fuller as and for her jointure., was 
denied in her answer duly filed. The defendants, T. C. Wat-
kins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs, filed their joint answer to said bill, 
alleging that Corrie A. Fuller had not made an election be-
tween her jointure and dower and until such election she is 
not entitled to dower in the real estate of which Rawley H. 
Fuller died seised and possessed; that if ai:id when she sur-
renders her jointure and demands dower, it should be as-
signed to her in his real estate other than that included in 
the South Boston Hospital property; and that if necessary 
to protect them, a part of the $40,000 paid for the Hospital 
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property and held and earmarked by the Executor, should be 
used to exonerate the South Boston Hospital real estate as 
to any right of dower which she may have therein. 
After evidence had been taken in regard to the circum-
stances under which vVilliam A. McCanless, Jr., and wife con-
veyed the ,v ashington Street residence in South Boston to 
Corrie A. Fuller and the method by which the pure.base price 
of $8.,500 was financed and paid by Rawley H. Fuller, the 
Trial Court entered its decree which is here complained of. 
STATUTES. 
On May, 19, 1938, the date of the deed from William A. 
7* *McCanless, Jr., and wife to Corrie A. Fuller, Virginia 
Code Section 5120 provided : 
"Section 5120. Jointure in bar of dower; effect of con-
veyance or devise.-If any estate, real and personal, intended 
to be in lieu of dower, shall be conveyed or devised for the 
jointure of the wife, such conveyance or devise shall bar her 
dower of the real estate, or the residue thereof, and every 
such provision, by deed or will, shall be taken to be intended 
in lieu of dower, unless the contrary intention plainly appears 
in such deed or will, or in some other writing signed by the 
party making the provision.'' 
The case of McDonald v. McDonald, 169 Va. 752, 194 S. E. 
709, w~s decided on January 13, 1938, and a rehearing was re-
fused on March 19, 1938. On April 1, 1938, the General As-
sembly of Virginia approved an amendment to Virginia Code 
Section 5120 which became law on its effective date of June 
20, 1938., and which was in effect on the date of the death of 
Dr. Rawley H. Fuller on July 24, 1943. This amended sec-
tion provides : 
'' Section 5120. J ointure in bar of dower; effect of con-
veyance or devise.-If any estate, real or personal, intended 
to be in lieu of dower, shall be conveyed or devised for the 
jointure of the wife, to take effect in profit or possession im,.. 
mediately upon the dea.t . o er us a on i e ·ng 
her life at least, su onveyance or ev1se shall bar her dower 
of the real estate, or the residue thereof, and every such pro-
vision, by deed or will, shall be taken to be inten~i~Jl. 
~ d.QlVer., unless the contrary intention plamly appear in such 
eed or will, or in some other writing signed by the party ;/;;t:ep~~ t~~i--- ~\ 
a_ ~ - ~- v-;__Ah,1--,,,, v.,Q ,...,,. 
( 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Virginia Code Sections 5120 and 5121 must necessarily be 
read and considered together in ultimately determining the 
issues here .involved. Section 5121 has not been amended 
since 1922, and .both .on the date of the deed and the date of 
the death of Dr. Fuller, provided as follows: 
J- ... -
'' Section .5121. Election of widow. to waive. jointure and 
demand dower.-But if such. conveyance or _devise were 
s• before ~the .marriage,. without the. assent in. writing or 
during the infancy of the female, or if it were after mar-
riage, in either case, the. widow .may, at her election, waive 
such jointure ang demand her dower. Such election shall be 
made within one year after the .death.of. the husband m~ within 
one year afte~ the admission of his will to probate .where the 
provision is by will,,and shall be made in.any court of .record 
in the county or corporation in which the husband resided 
at the time of his ·dei1.tb, oi: in the clerk's office of which the 
instrument creating the jointure is recorded, or by a writing 
recorded in such court, o~ in the clerk's office thereof upon 
such acknowledgment or proof as would authorize a writing 
to be admitted to record under chapter two hundred and 
eleven; and wh~n sha· shall' elect and receive her dower, the 
estate so conveyed or devised to her shall cease and deter-: 
mine; provided, however, that ·if any such conveyance or will 
is of doubtful import as to the 1 amount or value of the prop-::. 
erty the widow is to rcceive~thereby or thereunder and a suit 
in equity is pending wherein the said conveyance or will will 
~e construed in: such Tespect, the court in which said suit is 
pending shall, within said year, on the application of said 
widow, if she so desires; enter ail order extendin~ the time 
within which she is to make election for such additional pe-
riod beyond such year as will allo,v the said widow a reason~ 
able time; not exceeding· six months, for making such election 
after a final order shall have been entered in said suit con.:. 
struing such co1~veyance or will in such respect, either by a; 
trial court or any appellate court to· which it may be appealed; 
and provided further, that said widow may,·within such year; 
have the right t<F he·rself institute and maintain any· such suit 
for the: proper construction of said conveyance or will in such 
respect. '' · 
; ~ : - " -
. . 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
. . 
' .. - . 
First Assignment of Error. 
Petitioner assig·ns as error the action of the Trial Court in 
t·onsidering parol evidence to show that the cons~deration for 
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the residence property conveyed by .. William S. McCanless, 
Jr., and wife to her was actually paid by Rawley H. Fuller 
and excluding parol testimony establishing the fact that he 
purchased this property, paid for it, and had it conveyed 
9* to petitioner, his wife, as a birthday gift, and *to dis-
prove the claim of the appellees that it was intended as 
jointure in lieu of her dower. 
Second .A.ssignmient of Error. 
Petitioner assigns as error the action of the Trial Court 
in applying the provisions of Code Section 5120 in force on 
May 19, 1938., the date of the deed from ,vmiam A. McCan-
less, Jr., and wife to her, rather than the provisions of said 
section in force on July 24, 1943, the date of the death of her 
husband, Rawley H. Fuller .. 
Thircl Assign'l1ient of Error. 
In applying the provisions of Code Section 5120 in force 
prior to tbe 1938 amendment the Trial Court followed the de-
cision in the case McDonald v. McDonald. This action was 
error for the reason that this section was improperly con-
strued in said case and such improper construction should be 
overruled. 
ISSUES. 
(1) Is parol testimony admissible to show that the deed 
from ,vmiam A. McCanless, Jr., and wife to Corrie A. Fuller 
conveying her residence property for a consideration of 
$8,500, stated to have been paid by her., was in fact a gift from 
her husband, intended as a birthday present and not intended 
to be in lieu of dower, so that upon his death she is not re-
quired to elect to retain the property conveyed to her and 
waive dower or surrender such property and chim dower f 
• (2) If parol testimony is not admissible to show the 
10• real intention of Rawley H. Fuller to give, and Corrie 
A. Fuller, his wife, to receive, said property as a birth-
day gift, does Code Section 5120 in force ?n May 19, 1988, 
the date of said deed, operate to create s:nd conveyance as 
jointure under the construction of said section in the case of 
McDonald v. McDonald and require her to surrender her said 
residence property in view of lier written renunciation of the 
provisions made for l1er benefit under her husband's will, or 
do the provisions of Code Section 5120 as amended by the 
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Acts, 1938, apply to the facts and circumstances of the case 
so that she may retain her residence and claim dower? 
(3) If parol testimony is inadmissible to show the real in-
tention of Rawley H. } uller regarding his purchase of said 
residence property, and if Code Section 5120 in force on May 
19, 1938, is the proper statute to be applied to the facts and 
circumstances of the case, should the adjudication in the case 
of McDonald v. McDonald be reconsidered and overruled Y 
ARGUMENT. 
Parol Evidence .Admissible. 
Code Section 5121 clearly implies two types of jointure~ 
namely: (1) Where the conveyance or devise intended to be 
in lieu of dower was made before marriage with the assent in 
writing of the contemplated wife, and (2) where the convey-
ance or devise intended in lieu of dower was made be-
ll* fore the marriage without the assent in •writing of the 
contemplated wife or during· her infancy or after mar-
riag·e. . 
In every case arising under the first type of jointure the 
female, whether before or after marriage, is definitely and 
finally bound by the terms and provisions of the conveyance 
or devise and her assent in writing thereto. Her rights and 
the rights of her husband become :fixed and cannot be violated. 
She has no right of election should she survive her husband 
and she is forever barred of dower in his real estate. This 
type of jointure, often called an ante-nuptial agreement or 
settlement, is sl1own by the very provisions of Code Section 
5121 to be beyond its scope and application, and the distinc· 
tion between the two types is fully recognized and approved 
by the majority opinion in the McDonald case. 
"Jointure which is in lieu of dower, under the English stat-
ute of uses, in order to be an absolute bar, had among its 
requirements these: It must have ante-dated marriag·e, and 
it must take effect immediately upon the husband's death. 
''In Virginia it may be made before marriage or during 
coverture. If statutory provisions are complied with, a con:. 
tract before marriage usually goes into effect before marriage 
or as of its date. Here., at least, benefits conferred are not 
postponed until the husband's death, or until dower, of which 
it stands in lieu, might have been claimed. A man may settle 
funds upon his intended wife or convey to her a portion of 
his lands. A provision so made goes into immediate effect. 
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The mere fact that jointure is in lieu of dower does not post .. 
pone its benefits until dower could be claimed. 
"It is only when there bas been no assent in writing to 
the ante-nuptial settlement, or when the woman is an inf ant, 
or when it is made during coverture, that any question can 
arise." Il1cDonald v . .McDonald, 169 Va. 752, 194 S. E. 709, 
711. 
The other type of jointure includes a conveyance or devise 
intended to be in lieu of dower to a contemplated wife, 
12* without her *assent in writing or during her infancy, 
but is more often seen where the conveyance or devise 
intended in lieu of dower is made after marriage and the wife 
to whom it is made survives her husband. This second type 
of jointure is always linked with an election upon the death 
of the husband and is commonly referred to as '' statutory 
jointure' '. It becomes necessary in this case to determine 
whether upon the death· of Rawley H. Fuller on July 24, 1943, 
the deed from William .l'i.. McCanless, Jr., and wife to Corrie 
A. Fuller constituted statutory jointure, with its attending 
right and duty of election. 
The petitioner does not claim under a conveyance or devise 
shown on its face to have been intended to be in lieu of dower. 
Her title to the residence property arises under a deed of bar-
gain and sale from McCanless and wife by which the property 
was conveyed for a cash consideration of $8,500 stated to have 
been paid by her. Rawley H. Fuller was a stranger to this 
deed. After title became vested in petitioner he acquired a 
conting·ent right of curtesy. Parol testimony was relied upon 
by the appellees to prove that Rawley IL Fuller actually pur-
chased this property, paid for it and had it conveyed to his 
wife, they well knowing that without this parol testimony the 
deed of conveyance offered no opportunity to claim that it 
was intended in lieu of dower of petitioner in her husband's 
real estate. If this parol testimony is improper to vary the 
terms of her deed, no claim' can be made that it was procured 
by him for her jointure. If. parol testimony is admissible to 
show that her husband purchased the property and paid the 
full consideration, by the same token it is also admissible to 
prove by parol testimony the circumstances urioer which the 
purchase money was paid and the deed delivered. 
The undisputed testimony of Carrie Woltz, an old and 
13• trusted *friend and employee of Rawley H. Fuller, and 
R. A. Leggett, his intimate companion., establishes be-
yond the slightest doubt that Rawley H. Fuller purchased the 
property and had it .conveyed to his wife as a birthday gift. 
The undisputed testimony of petitioner shows that she re-
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ceived the property as a birthday present from her husband 
and that her deed was actually recorded on May 28, the date 
of her birth. This testimony conclusively establishes the fact 
that the purchase was made and that the deed was delivered 
as a gift and conclusively refutes any claim that Rawley H. 
Fuller intended at the time of the transaction to have the 
property conveyed to his wife as jointure in lieu of her dower. 
This testimony further refutes any theory that he acquired a 
vested right in the property. It was offered in support of 
the deed and not to vary its terms. It is certainly admissible 
to prove that as of its date of execution and delivery it was 
intended as an absolute conveyance, paid for by Rawley H. 
Fuller, a stranger to the deed, and understood and intended 
by him and petitioner, his wife, to be a birthday present from 
him to her, and not jointure in lieu of her dower. 
In 20 Am. Jnr. it is said: 
"Section 1142. In a number of cases, the courts have held, 
or said, that parol evidence is admissible to explain the writ-
ing., without expressing any clear theory as to the basis of 
the admission. The purpose a11d character of the transaction 
may be shown by parol. It is said that the rule which excludes 
parol testimony to contradict or vary a written instrument 
has reference to the language used by the parties. It does 
not forbid an inquiry into the object of the parties in execut-
ing and receiving the instrument * * 9 • '' 
'' Section 1159. In certain situations a contract is con-
strued in the light of the circumstances under which it was 
made. In such cases, the circumstances under which the con-
tract was made may be shown by parol. Although by stat-
ute the court must consider the circumstances under which a 
deed was made in arriving at the intention of the par-
14* ties, *it cannot weigh oral testimony for the purpose 
of altering or modifying the. terms of the deed. In fact, 
it is said that parol evidence is often the only means whereby 
the conditions and circumstances surrounding· the parties at 
the time of making the contract may be shown. Such evidence 
does not contradict or varv the terms of the instrument. 
Extrinsic evidence may be ·admitted to prove the circum-
stances under which a contract was made, wherever, without 
the aid of such evidence, it cannot be applied to its proper 
subject matter* • *. 
· ''W"here one party has been permitted to introduce extrinsic 
evidence of the facts and circumstances leading up to, and 
.(1on11ected with, the execution of a written contract, the other 
party may introduce evidence as to the same matters notwith-
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standing such evidence tends to vary or contradict the writ-
ing.'' 
'' Section 1131. There is a difference of opinion as to how 
far a party to the writing is bound as ·against a stranger. The 
rule has been announced that when the writing comes into 
question collaterally between one of the parties thereto and 
others, neither party is estopped to contradict or explain it. 
Since a stranger to an action is permitted to introduce parol 
evidence, it is argued that if one party is thus permitted to 
contradict the written contract by parol, all other parties to 
that action must be granted the same privilege, although they 
are parties to such -0ontract • • 1c." 
In S_ale v. Figg, 164 Va. 402, 180 S. E. 173, 175, it was said: 
''We think the plaintiff's position is correct and amply 
sustained by the authorities. 
'' In Williston on Contracts, vol. 2, sec. 636, p. 1232, it is 
said: 
'' 'The parol evidence rule assumes agreement upon the 
writing in question as a complete statement of the bargain. 
If' the parties never adopted the writing as a statement of the 
whole agreement, the rule does not exclude parol evidence of 
additional promises.' 
"And in 27 Ruling Case Law, sec. 264:, p. 532, the govern-
ing principles are thus laid down: 
" 'The rule prohibiting the admission of extrinsic evidence 
to vary or contradict a deed of conveyance does not include 
evidence of independent collateral agreements. Conveyances 
are frequently made in execution of agreements which the 
conveyances themselves do not show or attempt to show; and 
although no parol evidence would be admissible to change 
the legal effect of the conveyances themselves~ yet it 
15• may •be admitted to show on what consideration they 
were made, and to show the whole transaction, where 
the conveyances constitute only a part.' • • • 
"It is true that in that case the collateral contract was 
written, while in the case at bar the collateral agreement is 
oral. However, this does not alter the principle here in-
volved. It is well settled that, where the parol evidence rule 
applies, it excludes all evidence, whether written or oral, of 
the contract sought to be established. Williston on Contracts, 
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vol. 2~ sec. 646, p. 1252. )Vigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.), vol. 
5, sec. 2400, p. 237. '' 
In Richeson v. Wood, 158 Va. 269, 163 S. E. 339, 344, it was 
stated: .. ., 
' ' The rule above announced fa also. consonant with the rule 
that where one party has been permitted to introduce extrinsic· 
evidence of the facts and circumstances leading· up to . and 
oomiected with the. execution of a written contract, the otlier 
pa·rty · may introduce evidence as to the same matters, not-
withstanding that the evidence offered by him tends to vary or 
contradict the writing. 22 C. J. (Evidence), p. 1295., and cases 
there cited in Note 96.'' 
· There can be no doubt that Rawley H. Fuller died thinking 
that his wife was seised and possessed in fee simple of the 
i-esidence property given to her as a birthday present on May 
28, 1938. He purchased this property for her after he had 
executed his last will and testament on July 30, 1932; he had_ 
ref erred to this property as a gift to his wife on several occa-
sions in conversation with his intimate friend, R. A. Leggett, 
prior to his death; the record fails to show any declaration, 
written or oral, made by him in his lifetime indicating a sub-
sequent change of mind and no chang·e was ever madP. in his 
origfoal will of 1932. It is certain that petitioner was seised 
and possessed with the complete title just prior to her hus-
band's death. She can be deprived of such title only by 
16,f!I excluding facts and *circumstances clearly proved in the 
. case. Appellees can exclude these facts and circum-
stances only by invoking the ·rule of construction found at the 
end of Code Section 5120, which provides: 
. , '' * • * and every such provision, by deed or will, shall be 
taken in lieu of dower, unless the contrary intention plainly 
appears in such deed or will or in some other writing signed 
by -the party making the provision.'' 
It ·must be remembered that Code Section 5120 bas no pos-
sible application to the deed in question unless and until oral 
testimony is admitted to prove that the purchase price for 
the residence property of petitioner was paid by Rawley H. 
Fuller, who caused the deed to be made to her. At best, this .. 
rule of construction is a harsh one and often serves only as a 
t.rap to. inupcent parties. In no case should it be extended 
Beyond ·its ·rair and reasonable scope:· In ·its consideration 
and application it must be synchronized with well established 
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rules of evidence when oral testimony is relied upon to ex~ 
plain a conveyance, absolute upon its face,, so as to bring it 
within the scope of Section 5120. These rules of evidence 
fairly and reasonably admit all the evidence showing the facts 
"and circumstances surrounding the purchase of the Was~-: 
ington Street property and the execution and delivery of th~ 
deed to petitioner, particularly the intention of Rawley H. 
Fuller to give to her as a gift the property purchased and nQt 
to create jointure for her in lieu of dower in his real estate. 
It is submitted that the Trial Court erred in considering 
· the oral testimony relating to the purchase of tµe McCanless 
property and the payment of the purchase price therefor py 
Rawley H. Fuller and at the same time excluding from con-
sideration all testimony as to verbal declarations and state-
ments made by him as to his intentions in connection with the 
purchase of this property. 
17* *Jointure Statute in Force at Death of Rawley H. Fuller 
Controls This Case. 
Legislative Intent-
The profession was indeed surprised to learn of the con-
clusions in the McDonald case. We dare say that for over 
one hundred years, with rare exceptions, it has been generally 
thought that the conveyance or devise claimed to be jointure 
must contain a provision that the estate conveyed or devised 
was to take effect in profit or possession immediately upon 
the death of the husband. This was a natural and reasonable 
assumption, for statutory jointure (after marriage) and 
dower are correlative; they are contingent in nature and only 
become consummate upon the death of the husband leaving 
his wife surviving, and unless the wife survives the husband 
no election is necessary and this type of jointure bas no legal 
significance. A provision in a deed or will that the estate is 
to take effect immediately upon the death ·of the husband af-
fords a foundation for jointure, for if such estate is accepted 
by the widow it takes the place of dower, which becomes 
vested only after the husband's death. If this provision is 
wanting in a deed from a husband to a wife and the rule of 
construction is sufficient to imply that the estate conveyed is 
intended as jointure in lieu of dower, every absolute deed 
from husband to wife is converted into jointure. This sit-
uation seems strang·e indeed to the profession. 
Statutory dower in Virginia has always required that the 
conveyance or devise should be intended in lieu of dower~ The_ 
rule of construction relied upon by the appellees and quoted 
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above was added to the jointure statute by Acts, 1866, 
18* but there is no need for this •rul{} of construction if the 
conveyance or devise expressly states that it is intended 
to be in lieu of dower. When we consider a deed from a hus-
band to a wife., or from a third party to the wife of another, 
which is devoid of the provision -that it is intended in lieu of 
dower and which is also devoid of a provision that it shall 
take effect upon the death of the husband, we have an abso-
lute deed .meeting all of the requirements of Code Section 
5141 as to conveyances of land, whether by purchase or by 
gift. This is the situation in the case at bar. 
The McDonald case was finally concluded by the refusal of 
a petition for rehearing on March 18, 1938. The Legislature 
was then in session and on April 1, 1938, twelve days there-
after, it approved an amendment to Code Section 5120 ·by 
which the provision that the estate must '' take effect in profit 
or possession immediately upon the death of her husband and 
continue during her life at least" was re-enacted as a part of 
the jointure statute. This amendment became effective on 
June 20, 1938, and on that date there were no doubt literally 
thousands of deeds from husbands to wives, or deeds similar 
to the one in the McDonald case, which could be saved from 
the meshes of an inappropriate, unreasonable and harsh rule 
of construction given under Code Section 5120 in the Mc-
Donald case and apparently wholly unintended. 
The Legislature of 1938., in its prompt action taken to cure 
and remedy the dangerous defects existing in Code Section 
5120, must necessarily have intended that its re-enactment 
should reach and control not only subsequent deeds but the 
many prior deeds from husbands to wives or from third par-
ties to wives of others which had been steadily increasing in 
number since 1866 but which had not been brought into issue 
on the question of jointure by reason of the prior deaths 
19'* of the •husbands involved. Circumstances alone in this 
case· are sufficient to show and to convince the Court that 
the Legislature intended the re-enactment of the jointure stat-
ute to be retroactive in every case where the husband was 
living. 
It is not a coincidence that during the space of time from 
1866, when the rule of presumption was added, up to the date 
on which the McDonald case was decided there was not a 
single case in which the same question was considered and· 
adjudicated. The case of Shipp. v. Land, cited freely in the 
McDonald case, both in the majority opinion and in the 
minority opinion, clearly shows that the husband and wife 
contracted for and with regard to the relinquishment of the 
wife's dower interest in the husband's real estate. This utter 
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lack of controversy on the question indicates a unanimity 
among the profession that the rule of construction was predi-
cated upon the generally known and accepted requirement of 
statutory jointure that the estate given the wife must take 
effect at the death of the husband~ 
The Trial Court applied the jointure statute as it existed 
under Code Section 5120 prior to its re-enactment and decreed 
that the deed was intended in lieu of dower, that the petitioner 
must surrender her residence property and take only dower 
interest therein. The Trial Court was of the opinion that the 
rights of all the parties must be determined as of the date 
of the deed from McCanless to petitioner on May 19, 1938, 
unless Code Section 5120 as amended in 1938 was to be taken 
as .retrospective. And being of the opinion that the amend-
ment was not intended as retrospective, the adverse decree 
complained of was entered. 
Petitioner is firmly convinced that the Legislature fully in-
tended that its 1938 re-enactment of Code Section 5120 
20* should apply *'to every similar situation which ·might 
arise by reason of the death of a husband subsequent 
to its effective date. If such a construction gives to the stat-
ute a retroactive effect, then: it was intended as retroactive 
legislation. This conclusion is predicated upon statutory 
rules of construction. In Sutherland Statutory Construction 
(3rd Edition)., Vol. 3, page 46, we fin? the following: 
'' Section 1931. Surrounding Circumstances-Defects in 
Original Act. 
'' Since an amendment changes an existing Statute, the gen-
eral rule of Statutory interpretation that the surrounding cir-
cumstances are to be considered is particularly applicable to 
the interpretation of amendatory acts. The original act or 
section and conditions thereunder must be looked at. Judicial 
and executive interpretation of the original act especially 
must be considered. The court will determine what defects 
existed in the original act, which defect the legislature in-
tended to cure, and then construe the amendment so as to 
reduce or eliminate the defect intended to be remedied. 
"If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies 
arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical 
to regard the amendment as a leg·islative interpretation of 
the original ac.t-a formal change-rebutting the presumption 
of substantial change. But if the amendment was passed af-
ter a period in which many individuals had expressed dis-
satisfaction with the provisions of the original act rather than 
with its interpretation, the presumption of change is con-
firmed and it is reasonable to hold that the change intended 
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was of substance, that a new right was created or an exist-
ing one withdrawn.'' 
The original jointure statute as it existed prior to 1938 had 
received judicial interpretation only twelve days prior to its 
re-enactment by the General Assembly. Under such inter-
pretation serious defects had been found in the original stat-
ute; defects which had not been apparent to the profession. 
Clearly it was intended to eliminate these defects from the 
earliest possible moment. The re-enactment was a legisla-
tive interpretat_ion of the original statute-a formal change-
refuting the assumption of substantial change. 
21 • *1938 Re-enacfoient of Code Section 5120 Applicable. 
·while petitioner is confident that the Legislature intended 
its 1938 re-enactment to be construed as retroactive if this 
was necessary to safeguard against the loss of any real estate 
which had been deeded to a wife as a gift by her husband prior 
to 1938, as well as to protect the wife thereafter, where the 
husband was living on the date of the re-enactme;nt, she is 
also confident that this intended effectiveness of the re-enact-
ment is not dependent upon an adjudication that the re-enact-
ment of 1938 was intended as retroactive legislation. 
All legislation is not to be considered retroactive merely 
because it may be applied to facts and circumstances existing 
at the time of its enactment. In Reynolds v. U. S., 54 S. Ct. 
800, 803., it is said: 
'' * * * A statute is not rendered retroactive merely because 
the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent action de-
pends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent to 
the enactment. Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427, 435, 43 S. Ct. 154, 
67 L. Ed. 332, and cases cited.'' 
In Lewis v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 54 S. Ct. 848, 853, it 
is said: 
'' $ * • A statute is not retroactive merelv because it draws 
upon antecedent facts for its operation.'' ~ (Citing cases.) 
There appears to be no recorded case in which the court 
has decided the question as to whether the jointure statute in 
force at the date of a deed or the statute in force at the death 
of the hnsband ( where there is a difference) controls in any 
given case. Petitioner thinks that the reason is apparent. 
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The profession generally has considered,, and properly so, 
that the controlling date is the date of the *husband's 
22~ death, the only date requiring an election. 
Statutory jointure is wholly dependent upon dower 
consummate. The death of the wife prior to that of the hus-
band eliminates any possible question of dower both as to real 
estate owned at the time of his death and real estate conveyed 
by his sole act in his lifetime. A husband may acquire real es-
tate at any time during his wife's life and her dower as estab-
lished by statute may be changed from time to time so that at 
the time of his death leaving her surviving the statute in force 
may be entirely different from the statute as it existed at 
various dates during his lifetime on which he acquired said 
real estate. This legal statement is and must necessarily be 
well established. Statutory jointure is very similar in its 
, characteristics to dower, whether the deed or devise expressly 
states that it is intended as jointure in lieu of dower or 
whether such intention is presumed by the application and 
operation of the statutory rule of construction. It is potential 
only unless and until the husband dies prior to his wife. It 
speaks as of the death of the husband, as it is then and only 
then that the surviving wife is required to make an election. 
If the intention is expressed on the face of the deed or devise, 
the estate passes as an absolute estate upon the death of the 
wife leaving the husband and all questions of dower and 
election fade out of the picture. If the conveyance or devise 
is absolute on its face, free of any expressed intention as to 
intended jointure, the estate upon the death of the wife leav-
ing her husband passes as her absolute property and there can 
be no occasion to apply the rule of construction provided by 
statute. The wife cannot take both jointure and dower if 
she outlives l1er husband. She can take property by gift in 
his lifetime and dower in his real estate after his death. 
23* In the *joint lifetime of the husband and wife he can 
make successive conveyances. These conveyances may 
be intended as gifts or they may be intended as jointure; and 
he may express by writing an intention that certain convey-
ances shall be considered as jointure or as gifts. He may 
change the whole situation as it existed at the time of his 
death by expressions in his last will and testament. If the 
deed or devise expressly states that it is intended to be in 
lieu of dower and no subsequent change in writing or by will 
is made by tl1e husband, the deed or devise stands as jointure 
at the time of his death. If the deed is absolute on its face 
and has not been changed by subsequent writing, it stands 
as an absolute conveyance or gift at the date of the husband's 
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death, provided there is no presumption created by statute 
in favor of jointure. 
In McDonald v. M cDon,ald, 169 Va. 752, 194 S. E. 109~ 711, 
it is said: 
"It will be observed (and this is important) that under the 
Eng·lish statute jointure must take effect immediately upon 
the husband's. deat1l. We have no such statutory require-
ments. Of course, if an election may be made, it should not 
be made before that time, for, if it were, the husband might 
thereafter acquire property which would have made an earlier 
settlement grossly inequitable. It is not until his death that 
a decision is possible based upon final value of dower released, 
and it is doubtless for this reason that a decision is there 
postponed.'' 
The conveyance from McCanless and wife to petitioner just 
prior to the death of her husband, by all rules of the law and 
evidence, stands as an absolute conveyance. Had she died a 
moment before her husband, the residence would pass as such. 
A question of jointure as to this conveyance can and only 
arises because she outlived her husband. The date of his 
death is the all-controlling date of the case~ for it is then 
and only then that she is required to make an *election. 
24'* It is then for the first time that any one can claim that 
the absolute conveyance from McCanless and wife to 
petitioner was made by way of jointure. At this time Code 
Section 5120 had long since been re-enacted and in its re-
enacted form it required that the provision for her benefit 
must take effect upon her death and must pass an estate for 
at least her lifetime. Her deed from McCanless and wife is 
devoid of any such provision and the scope of the jointure 
statute falls short of reaching and affecting the facts and cir-
cumstances of her case. The re-enactment of Code Section 
5120 in 1938 under a prospective interpretation looks to the 
date in the future when by reason of the death of a husband 
leaving a wife surviving it may be contended that she is re-
quired under the duty of election prescribed by Code Section 
5121 to accept either dower in her husband's real estate or a 
conveyance or devise made in his lifetime and 'claimed to be 
jointure. It is then that we look to the. jointure statute to 
determine whether any such conveyance or devise constitutes 
jointure and requires an election by her. · 
The applicable jointure statute had been re-enacted more 
than five years prior to the death of Rawley H. Fuller. The 
deed in question is clearly beyond the scope of such statute 
and stands after his death as a gift from him to petitioner 
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which may be retained by her without surrenderins- her dower 
rights in his real estate. The. Trial Court committed preju-
dicial error when it applied the provisions of Code Section 
5120 in force on the date of the l\fcCanless deed and as con-
strued in the McDonald case rather than the 1938 re-enact-
ment of said section to the complete exoneration of peti-
tioner's residence as to the claim that it col}.stituted a part of 
the real estate of Rawlev H. Fuller. 
25"' *Rawley H. Fuller paid $6,000 of consideration for the 
McCanless residence aftei· the 1938 re-enactment of the 
jointure statute, at a time when the title to the property stood 
in petitioner's name and at a time when the amount paid was 
secured by deed of trust executed by her. This payment of 
$6,000 was, in fact, a gift to petitioner made after the effec-
tive date of the re-enactment and is therefore controlled by 
the statute as amended. The Trial Court might have at least 
decreed that the value of petitioner's residence to the extent 
of $6,000 was beyond the reach and scope of the statute. 
1938 Rule of Construction Inapplicable. 
Petitioner has strongly urged that Code Section 5120 as it 
existed at the death of her husband on July 24, 1943, is appli-
cable to the facts and circumstances of her case and that the 
McCanless deed conveying her residence property is beyond 
the scope of said statute. However, there is another con-
vincing reason supporting her claim to this property by way 
of a gift in the lifetime of her husband. Code Section 5120 
as it has existed since 1866 is divisible and should be consid-
ered as composing two parts. The first part is substantive 
and covers in modified form what is known as common law 
jointure, and the other part (wholly foreign to common law 
jointure or any known statutor; jointure of other states) is 
adjective and creates a rule of construction in favor of join-
ture. This rule of construction was a part of Code Section · 
5120 in force on May 19, 1938., the date of the McCanless deed, 
and was continued as a part of this section after the amend-
ment. However, under the statute as it existed on May 19, 
1938, the rule of construction provided that "every such pro-
vision, ( meaning any estate, real or personal, intended to be 
in lie'U, of dower conveyed or devised for the jointure of tlw 
wife) by deed or will, shall be taken to be in *lieu of 
26* dower, unless the contrary intention plainly appears in 
such de'ed or. will, or in some other writing signed by 
the party making the provision.'' (Paraphrasing ours.) 
The McDonald case held that under this rule of construction 
a deed, absolute on its face., from a husband to a wife, should 
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be treated as jointure upon the death of the husband leaving 
surviving his wife, and required her to elect to retain the 
property so conveyed or to surrender such property and claim 
dower in her husband's real estate. Immediately thereafter 
. and prior to the death of Rawley H. Fuller the statute was 
amended so that the rule of construction provided that '' every 
such provision ( mea1iin,q any estate, real or personal, intended 
to be in lieu of dower for the jointure of the wife, to take ef-
fect in profit or possession imm.ediately 'ltpon the death of her 
husband and contin.uing du.ring her life at lem;t) by deed or 
will, shall be taken to be in lieu of dower unless the contrary 
intention plainly appears in such deed or will, or in some 
other writing signed by the party making the provision.'' 
(Paraphrasing ours:) 
By comparison it' will be seen that the presumption or rule 
of construction created by statute is singularly different as 
it existed on the date of the deed and as it existed on the date 
of the death of Rawley H. Fuller. The deed from McCanless 
and wife to petitioner contained no provision that it should 
"take effect in profit or possession immediately upon the 
death of her husband and continue during her life at least.'' 
No question could or did arise as to jointure until the death 
of Rawley H. Fuller leaving petitioner surviving. No claim 
was made that the deed from McCanless and wife to peti-
tioner constituted jointure until the institution of this suit. 
The appellees subsequent to the death of Rawley H. Fuller 
rely solely upon this rule of construction to deprive peti-
27* tioner of her residence property conveyed *to her at the 
direction of her husband as a gift. .Appellees must 
necessarily rely upon the rule of construction in force on the 
date of the deed to defeat petitioner's absolute right to the 
property. Petitioner, ·while insisting that all of the provi-
sions of Code Section 5120 a~ it existed at the death of her 
husband are applicable to the facts and circumstances of her-
case, also relies upon the principle that a rule of construction 
creates no vested right and may be modified, ehariged or-
wholly elimi~ated prior to its application to any given con-
troversy. 
The rule of construction as provided by statute on July 24, 
1943., the date of the death of Rawley H. Fuller and on the 
date of the institution of this suit, must be predicated upon 
the premise that the deed in question provides that the estate 
should take effect in profit or possession immediately upon 
the death of petitioner's husband and continue during her 
life at least. Such a provision was not only absent, but her 
deed was executed by William A. M:cCanless and wife directly 
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to her and contained no expressed intention that it was in-
tended in lieu of dower for her jointure. Furthermore, the 
appellees can rely upon this rule of construction only after 
they have proved that the consideration was paid by Rawley 
H. Fuller. This proof was forthcoming only after his death 
and after the 1938 re-enactment of Code Section 5120. There 
is no reason or authoritv to extend this rule of construction 
to the status of a vested i·ight, but it should be applied accord-
ing to long established principles. It is agreed under these 
principles that such a provision as that found in the jointure 
statute was not intended or designed to establish a rule of 
prop~rty but only to prescribe a new rule of construction. 
In Shackelford, et al., v. Shackelford, et al., 181 Va. 869, 27 
S. E. ( 2d) 354, 359, the Court said: 
28• *"The word 'dower' means a widow's estate in her 
deceased husband's realty. It depends solely upon mar-
riage and survival. Only a married woman can have dower. 
'J ointure of the wife' can mean only an estate of a married 
woman in lieu of dower. 'Every such provision' means a con-
veyance or devise 'for the jointure of the wife'. And the last 
portion 'every such provision * * • shall be taken to be in-
tended in lieu of dower, unless the contrary intention plainly 
appear in such deed or will., or in some other writing signed 
by the party making the provision', has been held to be a 
rule of construction and not a rule of property. Again, the 
words 'every such provision' mean a conveyance or devise 
for the 'jointure of the wife.' '' 
In Bolling v. Bolling, .88 Va. 524, 14 S. E. 67, 68, the Court 
said: 
"Prior to the· act of 1866 the statute provided as follows: 
'If any estate, real or personal, intended to be in lieu of 
dower, shall be conveyed or devised for the jointure of the 
wife, such conveyance or devise shall bar her dower of real 
estate, or the residue thereof.' Code 1860, c. 110, Sec. 4. This 
statute was construed in Higginbotham v. Cornwell, 8 Grat. 
83, where it was held that a provision for the wife, to bar her 
dower, must not 01ily have been so intended, but such intent 
must appear from the conveyance or devise, either by express 
words or clear and necessary implication. To change this 
rule of construction, the amendatory act of 1866 was passed, 
which amended the statute by adding thereto these words: 
'And every such provision by deed or will, shall be taken to 
be in lieu of dower, unless the contrary intention plainly ap-
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pears in such deed or will or in some other writing signed by 
the party making the provision.' Acts 1865-66~ p. 166 ( Code, 
Sec. 2270). We concur in the view taken by the lower court 
and contended for by the learned counsel for the appellee 
here, that this amendment was not designed to establish a 
rule of property, but only to prescribe a new rule of con-
struction, and therefore that the same rule exists now that 
existed before the amendment, except as to the evidence of 
the intent with which the provision was made. And, being a 
rule of construction merely, it would seem to follow neces-
sarily that the statute has no application to foreign wills of 
personalty, which at common law are to be construed aceord-
ing to the lex domicilii. In other words, the common law on 
the subject remains unaltered, since there is no sufficient evi-
dence in the act of an intention to change it, notwithstanding 
the broad terms of the a~t.'' 
The part of Code Section 5120 prescribing this new rule of 
construction is. not substantive law but adjective law-
29• it affects *procedural rights. Counsel for Virginia 
Trust Company~ Executor and Trustee~ int:roduced no 
evidence at the trial and relied upon this presumption of in-
tention created by statute to cast the burden upon petitioner 
to introduce her evidence. This procedural right can in no 
way be considered a vested right. It was subject to change or 
elimination by act of the Legislature and any such act applies 
to all cases where the controversy has not been adjudicated. 
In Crawford on Statutory Constitution, pp. 581-585, it is said: 
'' Section 285. Statutes Pertaining to Procedure and Legal 
Remedies, Generally. 
'' As a general rule, legislation which relates solely to pro-
cedure or to legal remedies will not be subject to the rule that 
statutes should not be given retroactive operation. Similarly, 
the presumption against retrospective construction is inap- . 
plicable. In other words, such statutes constitute an excep-
tion to the rule pertaining to statutes generally. Therefore, 
in the absence of a contrary legislative intention, statutes per-
taining solely to procedure or legal remedy may affect a right 
no matter whether it came into existence prior to, or after 
the enactment of the Statute. Similarly, they may be held 
applicable to proceedings pending or subsequently com-
menced. In any event., _they will, at least presumptively, ap-
ply to accrued and pendmg as well as to future actions.'' 
'' Section 286. The Principle Exempting Statutes from the 
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Rule Against Retroactive Operation Analysed and Criticised. 
- ''The court in Byler v. Hershman (156 Misc. 349, 281 N. Y. 
S. 942) divulges the reason for exempting purely procedural 
statutes from the principle which looks askance upon a con-
struction which gives statutes retroactive operation. 
" 'Where a Statute pertains and relates to procedural or 
adjective law, such as the burden of proof, rules of evidence, 
etc., the Statute is held to be operative if the trial is held at a 
time subsequent to the enactment of the Statute, even though 
the events and premises upon which the action is based ante-
dated such enactment. 
'' 'The reason for that exception to the general proposition 
outlined above is readily perceptible. So long as the contents 
of the Statute relate only to the remedy, to the proceeding, to 
the form, then its postulates become operative only when and 
if such remedy, form or procedure is invoked., that is, 
30'il< at the trial. And if the trial post *dates the enactment 
of the Statute, even though the events upon which the 
action is based antedates such an operation, the operation of 
the Statute is in effect in fiduro just as all other Statutes. 
Thus, in truth, this exemption is no exception at all. It is 
an application of the general rule to a varied state of facts.' '' 
The appellees necessarily rely upon the presumption cre-
ated by statute as a rule of property-a vested right. In 
Kennedy Coal Corporation v. Buckhorn Coal Corporation, 
140 Va. 37, 124 S. E. 482, 484, the Court in discussing vested 
rights said : 
"Now, what is a vested rig·hU Without reference to a 
dictionary definition we would define it as a right, so fixed, 
that it is not dependent on any future act, contingency, or 
decision to make it more secure. Tested by this definition, 
we are of the opinion that the appellees had no such vested 
right as is contemplated by the decision relied -upon. The 
right of appellees at the time of the rendition of the judg-
ment of the Court contained in the decree was not fixed in 
the sense that it was settled. It was an inchoate rig·ht, which 
would become vested upon the happening of one of two events, 
viz., an affirmance of the decree of the trial court by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals, or by the expiration of the period 
allowed at the time in which to take an appeal." 
When the deed from M:cCanless and wife to petitioner dated 
May 19, 1938, is analyzed in the light of the above definition 
or explanation of a vested rig·ht, it falls far short of vesting 
in Rawley H. Fuller or his estate an absolute right to claim 
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as of the date of May 19, 1938, that the provisions thereof con-
stituted jointure in lieu of her dower. In the first place, the 
deed was dependent upon parol testimony to prove that the 
purchase price for the property conveyed thereby was paid 
by Rawley H. Fuller, and if this proof had been offered in 
his lifetime it could be further shown that he intended the 
conveyance as a gift. In the second place, the deed, absolute 
upon its face, without assent in writing of the petitioner 
31 *' to accept the *same in lieu of her dower, is dependent 
for possible jointure upon the contingency that peti-
tioner outlive her husband. In the third place, on the date 
of the deed and during the lifetime of Rawley H. Fuller, the 
rig·ht claimed for his estate bad not been settled. It was not 
ever an inchoate right, for no such right had been contem-
plated or intended by petitioner and her husband. It became 
a claim or right by operation of a rule of construction only 
after Rawlev H. Fuller had oredeceased his wife. 
The rule of construction contained in the 1938 re-enactment 
of Code Section 5120 is applicable to the facts of this case. 
We have seen 'that in order for this rule of construction to 
apply the deed or will in question must contain a provision 
that the conveyance or devise is to take effect immediately 
upon the death of the wife and to continue for her lifetime 
at least. Vl e find no such provision in the l\foCanless deed 
and it is confidently submitted that the Trial Court erred in 
applying the rule of construction in force on the date of this 
deed so that petitioner was required to surrender her resi-
dence property and was allowed to claim only dower therein. 
If Necessary, McDonald Case Should Be Overruled to Mete 
Out Justice in This Case. 
Petitioner does not believe that the Court will find it neces-
sary to reconsider the decision in the McDonald case in or-
der to protect her clearly intended and established rights. 
However, she desires to point out to the Court one sound 
reason in support of her claim that Code Section 5120 in 
force prior to the 1938 amendment was improperly construed 
in the McDonald case. 
32* * A careful analysis of the facts in the light of Code 
Section 5120 in force upon the date of the death of the 
husband-in the l\fcDonald case will show that the legal pre-
sumption thereby created was the sole evidence relied upon 
to prove jointure. This rule of construction does not state 
that every such deed or devise shall be taken to be in lieu of 
dower., but that every such provision by deed or will shall be 
taken to be in lien of dower. The McDonald deed, stripped 
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to a minimu~, is a simple conveyance from .A. (grantor) to B 
(wife of C) for her life, with remainder to C in fee simple. 
There is no '' such provision'' found in this deed and the in-
tention to convey in lieu of dower is supplied by the presump-
tion. Undoubtedly it was intended by the Legislature that 
some provision indicative, but not conclusive, as to intended 
jointure should be included in the deed in order for the rule 
of construction to apply. Otherwise, the language "every 
such provision by deed or will'' is without meaning or signifi-
cance. Certainly it ,vas not intended to convert every simple 
deed of gift from husband to wife into potential' jointure. If· 
you apply the rule of construction to a deed which provides 
that the estate is to take effect immediately upon the death 
of the husband the languag·c of the statute makes sense. If 
you apply this harsh rule of construction to every absolute 
deed from a husband to a wife or from a third party to the 
wife of another it will be contrary to all reason and logic and 
it will be contrary to the intention of the Legislature, which 
was so prompt to correct the apparent defects in the statute 
after the decision in the McDonald case. As stated by Justice 
Eggleston in his dissenting opinion in the McDonald case, the 
word '' join tu re" '' has had a technical and well defined mean-
ing in English and American jurisprudence for many years.'' 
No doubt this meaning· was in the minds of the legislators 
when the rule of presumption was added to the jointure stat-
ute in 1866. Under the statute as amended *at that time 
33* any estate, real or personal, could be conveyed or de-
vised for jointure, but surely the addition of the rule 
of construction was not intended to convert every simple gift 
by deed into a potential deed of jointure. Therefore, the 
language "every such provision by deed or will" referred to 
provision to the effect that the estate conveyed or devised 
should take effect immediately upon the death of the husband. 
This provision must be included in the deed or in the will if 
it be the will of another. The will of the husband always 
takes effect as of the date of his death. Accordingly, the rule 
of construction was improperly extended in the McDonald 
case to a situation not intended, for the deed to the wife from 
a third party was devoid of a provision that the estate was to 
take effect immediately upon the death of the husband. This 
provision would have been indicative, but not conclusive, of 
the intention of the husband that the life estate conveyed to · 
his wife was intended to be in lieu of dower. The presumption 
created by statute would have made such provision conclusive 
in the absence of a contrary intention plainly appearing in 
such deed or in some other writing signed by the husband. 
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Th<! deed in the McDonald case was a mere gift and met all 
of the requirements of Code Section 5141. 
Should the Court be of the opinion that the 1938 amend-
ment to Code Section· 5120 applies only to deeds or devises 
made subsequent to its effective date, the McDonald case 
should be overruled, for in the light of such opinion when 
published there will necessarily be other cases like the one 
at bar, in which miscarriage of justice will result from such 
construction. 
34* *CONCLUSION. · 
Petitioner submits that the decree complained of is er-
roneous for the reasons that the Trial Court (1) should have 
considered the undisputed testimony introduced to prove that 
Rawley H. Fuller intended to purchase, pay for and convey 
the McCanless property to her as a birthday gift; (2) should 
have applied the provisions of Code Section 5120 in force o~ 
the death of Rawley H. Fuller to all attending facts and cir-
cumstances in the determination of the question whether the 
McCanless deed constituted jointure; (3) should have con-
sidered the rule of construction relied upon by the appellees 
as a right of procedure and not a right of property and should 
have applied the rule of construction in force on the date of 
the death of Rawley H. Fuller instead of that existing on the 
date of the McCanless deed; and ( 4) should, if necessary, have 
decided that the construction of Code Section 5120 as made 
in the McDonald case was not applicable to the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case and should have so construed Code 
Section 5120 as to exonerate petitioner's residence property 
from the claim that it constituted dower; any one of which 
reasons is sufficient for the Court to reverse said adverse 
decree. 
If an appeal is allowed petitioner desires to adopt this pe-
tition as her brief. 
Petitioner avers that copies of this petition for appeal were 
mailed on July 1{, 1944, to J. R. Tucker, Richmond, Virginia, 
Irby Turnbull, Boydton, Virginia, McKinney and Settle, 
South Boston, Virginia, Attorneys of Record for Virginia 
Trust Company, Executor and Trustee of Rawley H. Fuller; 
Tuck and Bagwell, South Boston, Virginia, Henrv W. Mc-
. Laughlin, Halifax., Virginia, Attorneys of Record .. for T. C. 
Watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs; and James Easley Ed-
35i1t munds~ Guardian ad literJ°i for '"'Mary Anne Fuller; and 
said counsel have been notified that this petition will 
be presented in vacation to the Honorable Edward W. Hud-
gins at Chase City, Virginia. 
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/ 
/ Counsel for petitioner desire to state· orally the reasons for 
review of the decree compfainecl of. . 
For the foreg·oing reasons petitioner prays that an appeal 
and supersed('aS will be awarded her from the judgment and 
decree aforesaid and that said decree may be reversed and 
that your petitioner may be finally decreed the title and owner,.. 
ship to the property claimed by her as a gift from her hriR-
band, Rawley H. Fuller, and that such property may be re-
lieved and exonerated from anv claim that it constitutes 
jointure, and that such relief prayed for may be fully grantea. 
CORR.IE A. ~-,FLLER, 
Petitioner, 
By .JAMES S. EASLEY, 
EDWIN" B. :ME.A.DE., 
Counsel. 
The undersigned attorney at law practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virg'inia, does hereby certify that in his 
opinion this case should be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
Dated at Danville, Virginia, this 14th day of .July, 1944. 
Received July 17, 1944. 
ED,VI~ B. JIEADE, 
Danville, Virginia. 
Enw·. "\Y. HUDGINS. 
July 29, 1944. Appeal allowed and supersedcas awarded. 
Bond $500.00. 
VIRGINIA: 




Pleas before the Honorable Henry C. Leig·l1, ,Judge' desig-
nated to try the Chancery suit of Virginia Trust Co. v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als., at the Courthouse of Halifax 
County, on :Monday the 19th day of June, 1944. 
Be it remembered, That heretofore, to-wit, at rules helq. 
for said Court in the Clerk's Office thereof on the First l\Ion-
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<lay in January, rnH, canw Virginia Trust Company Execu-
tor and Trustee u11de1· tlte will of Rawlev H. Fuller and filed 
its bill in Chancery against Corrie ... .\.. Fuiler and others ,vhich 
bill is in the following worJ:-; and figures: 
wige 2 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
Virginia Trust Cornpm1y 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als. 
BILL 0~, C01[PLAINT. 
'Po the Honornble .T udge of the Circuit Court of Halifax 
Countr. 
J. 'Your complaimmt, Virginia Trnst Company, respect..: 
ftJllY represents unto the Court that it is a corporation, duly 
incorporated unde1· the laws of the Commonwealth of Vir-
gi'nia, havinµ: itH principal place of business in the City of 
Ui.elnnond, Virginia, and authorized, under its charter, to do 
the business of a 1 rn::-;t eompany including authority to act 
a,~ personal representafr\'e of the estates of decedents and 
a~ trustee of trnHt estate:;;. 
2. On the 24th dny of ,July., 1942, Rawley H. Fuller, a resi-
d.cnt of Halifax County, Virginia, departed this life having· 
pnwiom;ly executc•d a will ,vherein your complainant was 
named aH sofo executor and by "\,vhich, after providing for the 
·p~yment of testator's debts, funeral and testamentar.v ex-
penses and bequeathing· to l1i~ wife, Corrie A. Fuller, all of 
hiR household furnitm·p and ffffed8, jewelry, wearing· apparel 
and automobiles, lie devised and bequeathed fo your com-
plainant his entire residuary estate to be held, administered 
·~wd di~trilmted upon frush; set out in said will. An attested 
(~opy of said will is hereto annex(ld, marked "Exhibit A with 
Bill'' and iH prayt'.)d to he n'.)ad ai1<1 considered as a part of 
thiH hill as tl10ug·h st)t out at la r~·e herein. 
3. Rawley H. Fnllc~r was survived hr his widow:, Corrie A. 
:Fuller, by three children hy the marriage disRolved by bis. 
qct~tl1 and by n former rnmTiag·e, namely, Ra,vley H. Fuller,. 
.lr., SaraJ1 J1..,. Hudgfos nrnl ·william Allen Fuller and lw a 
foo-ally adoph.,d child, ?\fary Anne Fuller, an infant, ali' of 
v1hom are beneficiaries and are the sole beneficiaries of the-
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4. On the 27th day of .July, 1943, before the Clerk of the 
Circuit Court of Halifax County, the will aforesaid 
page 3 r was duly admitted to i::irobate as shown by the order 
annexed to JiJxhibit A and youl' complainant quali-
fied as executor thereof by taking the oath and executing the 
bond required by law and has since been acting as the sole 
executor of decedent's estate. A certificate of the Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of Halifax County showing the qualification 
of your complainant i~ hereto attached marked ''Exhibit B 
with Bill" and is prayed to be read as a part of this bill as 
though set out at larg~e herein. 
5. Five appraisers of tlrn estate of Hawley H. Fuller were 
duly appointed by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax 
County and the five appraisers so appointed duly met., inven-
toried and appraised the estate of said decedent, such ap-
praisal showing that the estate of decedent consisted of per-
sonal property of the rnluc of $7:3,966.62 and real estate of 
the value of $37,500.00. An attested copy of said appraise-
ment is hereto annexed marked "Exhibit C with Bill" and is 
prayed to be read ns a part of this bill a~ though set out at 
large herein. Your complainant has no rea~on to doubt tltc 
accuracy of said appraisement as of the time it was made 
ancl filed, but charges that by reason of supervening circum-
stm1ees, as hereinafter set out in this Bill, said inventory and 
appraisement is inconect in its inclusion at a nominal fig·ure 
of the gTeater part of the tangible personal property be-
queathed to Corrie A. Fuller and in its failure to include the 
real estate in the town of South Boston, 'Va., occupied by 
deecdcnt and his fmnil.v as a home, the title to which stands 
in the name of Conic A. Fuller, but which has, by her elec-
t.ion .to renounce testator's will and to claim dower in his real 
estate as hereinafter set out., become a part of the estate of 
R.awley H. Fuller. 
6. Complainant clinrg;cs that the personal estate of dece-
df\nt is amply sufficient to discharge all debts, taxes and tesba-
nwntary expenses of the estate without resort to the real 
estate; that title to all of decedent's real estate passed by 
his will to Virginia Trust Company as Trustee but 
page 4 ~ tlJat, by reason of the widow's renunciation of the 
will and eh~ction to take dower, eomplainant's title 
to such real est.ate iR irnhjed to the widow's right of dower 
thr.rein. · 
7. By a writing dn ted A ug·ust. 13, 1.943, and duly recorded 
in the Clerk's Offic0 of Halifax County, Virginia, on August 
14! 1943, Corrie A. Fuller renounced the provisions of the 
will of Rawlev H. Fuller and elected to claim dower in his 
real estate and her diRf.ributive share in the personal prop-
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erty of her deceased husband as provided by statute, and 
complainant charges that by virtue of such election it became 
and is now tlie dutv of Corrie A. Fuller to surrender and de-
liver to the complainant all household furniture and effects, 
jewelry,, wearing apparel and automobiles which had been 
left in possession of or delivered to the said Corrie A. Fuller 
by the executor pursuant to the provisions of the will of Raw-
ley H. Fuller, prior to lier renunciation and election afore-
said and also to convey to the complainant as trustee under 
the will of Rawley H. FuJler, subject to her dower right, any 
real estate which was conveyed to her or purchased with the 
money _of Rawley H. FuUer and eaused to be conveyed to 
her by Rawley H. ],uller during· his lifetime for her jointurE~· 
and in lieu of dower, none of which has been done. A copy of 
said deed of renunciation is herewith filed marked '' Exhibit 
C-l with Bill'' as a part hereof. 
Acting under the 5th Article of the will of Rawley H. Fuller, 
no detailed inventory or appraisement of the· tangible per-
sonal property above mentioned was made, other than a 
Lincoln Zephyr automobile which was valued at $675.00, but 
all other household furniture and :fixtures were included bv 
the appraisers at the lump sum of $1,000.00, and your com-
plainant has no knowledge of· the character or value of this 
property. 
8. Complainant charges that hy deed dated :May 
page 5 ~ 19, 19:18, ·wmiam A. McCanless., l r. and Katherine 
S. McCanless, his wife, conveyed to Corrie A. Ful-
ler for a collsideration of $8,500.00 cash, a certain house and 
]ot in the town of South Boston, Va., described as follows: 
"Lying and being on the east side of ""\Vasbington Street 
in said town and described as Lot #10 on the plat of the sub-
division of the ,Joseph Stebbins Estate, recorded in Halifax 
Clerk's -Office in Plat Book 1, page 122, said lot fronts 50 
feet on Washing-ton Street and extends back 162.8 feet on 
the north side and 161.4 feet on the south side.'' 
And complainant charg·es that said real estate was pur-
chased by Rawley H. J.i,ulfor and the entire consideration paid 
by him from his own funds and that Rawley H. Fuller caused 
the conveyance of said real estate to be made to his ,vif e., 
Corrie H. Fuller, intending the same to be for her jointure 
and in lieu of her dower in bis estate. 
An attested copv of said deed is hereto annexed marked 
''Exhibit D with Bill'' and prayed to be read as a part of 
this Bill as though the same was set out at larg·e herein. 
And complainant further charges tl1at at the time of Raw·-
/ 
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]ey H. Fuller's death, said renl estate remained in the ownct-
ship and possession of Corrie A. 1~1 uller who was thereupou 
required to elect whether she would retain said real e:;tatb 
and waive her dower, or claim her dower and surrender said 
real estate. That Corrie A. Fuller elected, as set out in para-
graph 7 of this Bill, to claim her dovi1er and thereupon sa.id 
house and lot became a part of the testator's estate aud i-r. 
became and is now her duty and obligation to return to her 
lrnsband 's estate, the real estate lrnreinahove in this para-
graph described, subject to her dower therein, wliich has not 
been done. 
~). Complainant charges that Rawley H. Fuller died seizcil 
and posse::;sed of certain other real estate in the· 
page 6 ~ town of South Boston known as the South Boston. 
Hospital; that on or about August 7, 1943, before 
Corrie A. Fuller had renounced her husband's will and elected 
to take dowe/ in his real estate, complainant entered into a 
contract to sell said hospital and the equipnient thereof to 
T. C. "'vVatkins, .Jr., and I. K. Bri.p;g·s for the sum of $40;000.00 
eash; that following her renunciation of the ·will Corrie A. 
Fuller filed suit in the Circuit Court of Halifax Countv-
against this Complainant and the beneficiaries under the wiil 
of Rawley I-I. Fuller, seeking to enjoin the execution of sai<l 
contract and to rescind the same; that by decree entered in 
said cause on October 1;5, 1943, the Court refused to issue a 
permanent iujunction as prayed, held "that the conduct of. 
tbe executor of the will of R. IL Fuller and T. C. ·watkins, 
.Jr., in entering into the contract for the sale aud purchase 
of the property kno-wn as the South Boston Hospital, includ-
ing the real estate and personal property and equipmcut used 
in connection therewith, w·as not adually or construrtively 
fraudulent on the part of either of them'' mi.cl dismissed the 
Bill ''without prejudice to the rights of t]1e complainant, 
Corrie A. Fuller, to institute such proceedings as she may be 
advised are proper for the recovery and assfa·nment of her 
dower in the real estate of which her husband died seized mHl 
possessed • * * and witl10ut prejudice to the rights of the 
executor or any other dcvisee of the late R. H. Fuller to 
institute such 1jroceedings as they ma~y he advised are rigl1t 
and proper in connection with their rights as such executor 
and clevisees in the real and personal estate of the late R. H. 
Fuller, which have not l1ecn litigated and decided in s1.1. 1t 
suit''. An attested copy of said decree is hereto annexed 
marked "Exhibit E with Bill'' and is prayed to be read 88 a 
pa rt hereof. 
Thereafter, on or ahout October 20, 1943, this complainant 
as executor and trustee under the will of Rawley H. Fuller 
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,,.cmvey<.\d to T. C. \\Tatki11s, ,Jr. and I. K. Briggs with Special 
Warranty of Title the laud and building comprising 
pag·t~ 7 }· tlJC South Bost.on Hospital a1Hl transferred to said 
purchasers the personal property used in connec-
t.ion therewith, receiving payment in cash the sum of $40,000. 
' A11 attested copr of said deed h, hereto annexed marked 
"'Exhibit :B, ,:vith Bill" and is pl'ayed to he read and consid-
P.red as a part hereof. 
Thereafter at tlw First December Rules Corrie A. ~.,ullcr· 
.!Ht~d in this Court n Bill in Equity again~t T. C. ·watkins, .Jr. 
,Hl<1 I. K. Briggl-, wherein i~ rec·ited the ~ale of the hospital 
property abon_. me11tioncd, lier claim to dower therein, that 
~ud1 dow0r cannot be Hssiµ:ned iu kind in said prnpert~r aud 
prayin.~·, pursuant to the proYisio11s of Code Section 51:25, that 
t.hc eourt aseertai11 the fai1· annual nmtal value of said hos-
pital allCl enter its deen•e rpquiring the 1mrehasers to pay to 
Uonie .A. Fuller fo1· lier life 011e-thirtl of the fair annual 
rental value Ro H~ecrtaincd aHcl to secure such payments by 
fh::ing· a lien upon the propert~·. Said :.;u it is no,v pending. 
10. Yonr complainant eharges that it i~ not a party to tlm 
lnst-me11tioncd suit and is not charg-cnble with tlie payjnent. 
of nnr :--tm1s whieh tl1e Court may tben•in decree to be paid 
io Corrie A. Fuller in :-:afoifaction of lier dower, if any, in 
Kaid hospital property but <·om'plainnnt i:-- vitally interested 
ill ·havi11,g determined at one time arnl in OllL .. suit all question~ 
relating- to the dower rig-ht~ of Corrir A. Fuller in all of the 
, rr.al estate of Rawley H. Fuller whirh, complainant eharg·es, 
iucludes 110t onl:· the ]10spital pro1wrty aforesaid but tlw 
.. home property'· described in pn rap;raph 8 and a one-half 
undivided int<:•rN,t in a form of approximately 308 acres 
known as the '' Oarrctt ~.,a rm", Ioea tecl in Halifax Conn tr 
near the town of Clover; i11 lwvirn.!,· an accounting of tlw 
tcJ.ng·ihle perRonal prnperty, left with or turned over to tlw· 
:·~:1.id Corrie A. Fuller after her husband's death upon the 
nssmnption thnt she had acc(•pftc,d or would accept 
pag·e 8 r the JH'OYisions of the will of Rawley H. Fuller 01' 
a deliYer~· thereof, and in lrnviug- the court appor-
tion the eonsideration receivf)d by eomplainant for the South 
Boston Hospital and determinP wl1at part thereof is to be 
z•.onsidered as the pnrclrn~e prier of tlw real estate involved 
:1.nd what part represents the Jmrclws0 priC'e of the personal 
property and equipment. 
11. Your comph1imrnt cliar~res that tl10 real estate of Raw-
ley H. Fuller in whieh Corrie A. Fnller is· entitled to dower 
or may be cntith•d to dower i~ as follow~: 
u. The home place described in "Exhibit D witl1 tbis Bill''",. 
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title to which stands in the name of Col'rio .A .. Fuller but which 
in equity belongs to your complainant a~ trustee under the 
will of Hawlcv IL Fuller hY reason of the election of Corrie 
.A.. Puller to t~1ke dower in her husband's real estate .. 
b. rrlw Hospital Property in the town of South Boston 
which was conveyed by complainaut to T. C. ,Vatkins, Jr., 
n11d I. K. Briggs by deed dated October, 1943, being '• Exhibit 
P with Bill'', to ,vhicb deed refei·ence is made for a descrip-
tion of said 1froperty. 
c. A one-half undivided intere:-;t in a tract of land near 
Clover, Va .. , which at present ~omprises approximately 308 
acres. Tbis tract, known as the ''Garrett Farm'' and then 
comprising 351.04 acres, was, by deed dated May 15, 1911, and 
reeordecl in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax 
County in D. B. 108, p. 450, eouyeyed by :Mary C. ·watkins 
and ~rucker C. Watkins to ,Y .. J. :finch, C. R. Fince, G. B. 
Gibson and R. H. Fuller, partner~ trading as Clover Real 
F..J~tate Co. and .a copy of said deed markecf "Exhibit G with 
Bill'' is hereto annexed. 
By deed dated .July ~' 1912, a11d r<:~corded in said Clerk's 
Office in D. B. 110, p. 20:2, V{. ,J. Fiiwh conveyed to the other 
three partners his undivided interest in Haid land and a copy 
· of this deed is hereto annexed marked '' Exhibit H 
page 9 r with Bill.'' By deed clafocl December 27, 1919, and 
recorded in said Clerk's Office in D. B. 125, p. 218, 
Ivy II. Finch, in her own right aud t1s executor with power of 
sale of her husband C. R. Finch, conveyed the one-third un-
divided interest of her deeeascd husband i11 sRid land to the 
rmnaining partners R. II. Fuller and G. B. Gibson. A copy 
of this deed is hereto annexed marked "Exhibit I with Bill". 
G. B. Gibson died testate., his wido,, ... , Cora F. Gibson, as bis 
i;ole devisee, succeeding to hi8 one-half undivided interest in 
said real estate. By -deed dated November 18, 1934, and 
recorded in said Clerk's Office in D. B. 149, p. 417, R. H. Fuller 
and Corn Ii\ Gibson, as tenants in common of said real estate 
e011vevcd to .T. ,J. Smiley 43.8 acres thereof as shown on an 
attacl1ecl plat, leaving a;1 approximate acreage of 308 acres. 
A eop? of said deed marked "Exhibit. ,J with Bill'' is hereto 
attnelied and this exhibit as well as all other exhibits in this 
paragTaph and Clause ( c) referred to arc prayed to be read 
as a pa rt of this Bill. 
12. Your complainant cliarges that the home place de-
scribed in Exhibit D is a residence yn·operty in which the as-
signment of dower in kind would be impossible and that a sale 
of said property and investment .of one-third of the net pro-
ceeds of sale for the benefit of the widow for her life is the 
only practical method of assigning dower in this specific prop-
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erty, unless upon consideration of all of the facts, the court 
shall determine to assig·n the widow's whole dower in said 
property. 
Dower in the Hospital property may be assigned in accord-
ance with the· provisions of Code Section 5125 or the court 
having ascertained the proportion of the total consideration 
of $40,000. which is properly attributable to the real estate 
involved in the sale of that property, may ascertain the money 
value of the widow's dower therein and credit the same 
against the value of other property assigned to the widow 
for her dower. 
pag·e 10 ~ Your complainmH and Cora F. Gibson, after con-
sultation with counsel for Corrie A. Fuller, have 
agreed to offer the Ganett Farm for sale at public auction in 
the near future, Mrs. Fuller agreeing to unite in any deed 
or deeds to purchasen; for the purpose of conveying he1· 
dow·er therein upon the agreement of complainant that her 
dower interest in the land shall be ascertained and charged 
upon the proceeds of sale con)ing into the lands of your com-
plainant. 
In consideration of the premises and acting under the power 
reserved to it by the Court's decree of Oct. 15, 1943, com-
plainant prayed that Corrie A. Fuller, Rawley H. Fuller, .Tr., 
Sarah F. Hudgins, ,:Villiam Allen Fuller, Mary .Anne Fullei-
(an infant), T. C. "\V'atkins, .Jr., and I. K. Briggs be made 
parties defendant to this bill and that the adult defendants 
be required to answer the same but not under oath, answe1· 
under oath being expressly waived; that a guardian ad litem. 
be appointed to defend the interests of the infant defendant 
and be required to answer the same; that process against all 
defendants issue; that the court determine the proper alloca-
tion of the purchase price of the South Boston Hospital as. 
between the real estate and the personal propertv trans-
ferred in said sale; that the Court by its decree adjudicate 
that the real estate described in Exhibit D with the bill waH 
purchased by Rawley H. Fuller and caused to be conveyed 
to Corrie A. Fuller, for her jointure and in lieu of dower in 
his real estate, that Corrie A. Fuller upon the death of Raw-
ley H. Fuller wa.s put to lier election to waive dower. and re-
tain such real estate or surrender such real estate to the 
devisee thereof and claim dower and that Corrie A. Fuller 
having elected to claim dower, be required to transfer said 
real estate to Virginia Trust Company, trustee under the will 
of Rawley H. Fuller, subject to her right of dower therein; 
that the Court ascertain and assign, in one of the 
page 11 } methods authorized by law, the dower of Corrie A. 
Fuller in all of the real estate of Rawley H. Fuller 
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in which she is dowable; that t11is suit be consolidated with 
the suit of Corrie A. Fuller F. T. C. ,vatkins and I. K. Briggs 
pending in this Court and the two causes be heard together; 
that Conic A. Fuller be required to deliver to or account witL . 
the Executor for all tangible personal property of Rawley H. 
Fuller in her possession and control or hy her delivered to 
another; that all such accounts and proceedings may be had 
as maY be necessarv to fully ascertain the interests of Corrie 
A. Fuiler in the real and pe~·sonal estate of Hawley H. Fuller; 
that complainant may haYe the advice and guidance of the 
Court in connccti011 with the ascertainment and settlement o.f 
all such interests of Corrie A. Fuller, in the estate of her 
husband, Rawley H. Fuller, and that your complainant may 
have such other, further and general relief in the premises as 
the nature of the case may require or to equity may seem 
meet. 
And complainant will ever pray, etc. 
VIRGIXlA TR.UST CO)IPANY 
Executor and Trustee under the will 
of Rawley H. Fuller 
JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER 
IRBY TUR,NBULL 
:McKINNEY & SETTLE 
Counsel for Complainant 
By Counsel 
page 12 } COPY OF .,YILL O:B, RA "'WLEY H. FULLER-
W. B. 47, P. 553. 
KNO"W ALL MEN BY THESE PRESEN"TS: Thal I, 
RA ,vLEY H. FULLER, a resident of South Boston, Halifax 
County, Va., being of sound and disposing; mind and memory, 
do berebv annul and revoke anv and all wills and codicils 
thereto b·y me at any time herefofore made and I do make, 
ordain, publish and declare this to be my la8t will and testa-
ment, in manner and form following, namely: 
ARTICLE I I direct that all of my just dehts, funeral and 
testamentary expenses be paid as soon as conveniently can 
be clone after my decease. . 
ARTICLE II I do g·ive and bequeath unto mv beloved wife, 
Corrie A. Fuller, to be her own absolutely, ali of m>r house-
hold furniture and effects, useful as well as ornamental, and 
also all of my jew·elry and wearing apparel and any pleasure 
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automobile~, and the aere~sories thereof belonging to me at 
the time of my deeease. 
ARTICLE III All aml every the rest, residue and remain-
der of my estate, real awl personal, of whatsoever kind and 
wheresoever situated, I do give, devise and bequeath m1to the 
Virginia Tmst Company, of the City of Ricln11011d, Va., in 
trust, neverthele8s, for tlie following mentioned uses and pur-
poses, muuely : 
(a) To hold tl1e same during a trust term to be measured 
hy the interv~il of time elapsing between the date of my death 
aml the date upo11 which my youngest child, surviving me,, 
living to attain tlie age of twenty-one years, attains that age,. 
or, dying during such term, would have attained that age had 
~uch child lived. 
(b) During· the said term, nfter first defraying all costs of 
administration of said trust, including the payment of taxes 
on real and pen;onal property, constituting- the trust estate, 
the cost of keeping sueh real estate in proper repair and adc-
.quately irnmred, to pa)· <>VL'r the balance of the net income aris-
iug· from said trust est_ate, to and for the benefit, support, and 
maiutpmmce, of my wife and children, and/or such of them 
as are alive during· said tmst term and in such 
page 13 ~ shares and proport'ions amoug them as in the ab-
solute discretion of m-v said Trnstec shall be 
deemed best. But it is my desire tiwt such <livisiou or appor-
tiomnent of i11couw slrnll be as nearly equal among- them as 
may be pradicablc. 
rr110 fol'ep:oi11g provision of this my ,vill is made for tlm 
lwnnfit of my wife and children, out of a sincere desire 011 my 
pa1-t to best eorn,crve tho Pstate and provide for their com-
fort and :mpport; nevertheless, if at any time during the said 
trust term it should be or become necessary in the judgment 
of my said 'l:rustec, on account of sickness, surgical opera-
tion, or other extreme or unusual emergency, or in the event 
of inadequacy of net income for the purpose aforesaid, to use· 
a pa)'t of the princip,d of the said trust estate, I do full~~ au-
thorize and empower my ~nill Trustee, h1 its absolute discre-
tion, to expend out of such principal, from time to time, so 
mud1 thereof as may he necessary and sufficient for the afore-
said pm'fJ08e::;, or any of them; and I do further direct that 
n,ny and all such i;nms, i-;o taken and expended out of principal, 
~hall lw a general eharg·e against the entire trust estate, at the· 
1.ime held in trnst, and shall not be charged against or de-
ducted from any intt}rest and/or estate therein which the par-
ticular henefieiary (for wl10se benefit the expenditure of prin-
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cipal is matle) may fopu or thereafter have iu said trust es~ 
tate. 
( c) Upon the termination of said trust term., then and 
thereupon to divide the tllen trust estate into a::; many equal 
portions as }-:hall be the number of my chilclreu surviving at 
that time, ancl C.'hiklre11 dying before that time leaving issue 
then surviving, plus one such equal portion for my said wife, 
should she theu be living. .A.ncl then and thereupon to con-
vey, tr-ansfer, pay and deliver over one of such portions to my 
said ·wif c, should she U1en be living, and one of such portions 
to each of my children, then living, and one of such portions 
to the is~me, taken collectin~ly, of such of my children who 
theretofore shall have died ( either in my lifetime or during . 
said trust term) leaving- issue then surviving. 
page 14 ~ ARTICLE IY ·whenever and wherever, in any 
of the foregoing provisions of this my will, the 
words ''child'' or ''children'' shall have been used, I do ex-
pressly direct and declare that such words are intended to 
embrace and are to be taken to mean not onlv child or children 
of mine legally begotten, hut. also any chilcl or children of 
mine by adoption. 
ARTICLE V I nominate and request the ap11ointment of 
tl1c Virginia Trm;t Company, of the Cit~· of R.iehmond, Va., to 
be the Executor of this my last will and testament, and I do 
request that no appraisement he made of 1ny est.ate. 
ARTICLE VI I hereby expressly authorize and empower 
mv said Executor and/or Trustee to take over and to hold 
as' a part of my estate, and/or of said tnrnt estate, any stocks, 
hond8, investrnenh;, or other personal property, and nlso any 
real estate, belong-inµ; to me at the time of my decease, with 
full authority and power from time to time to sell, exchange 
or otherwise dispose of, any such stocks, bonds, investments 
or other per~01ial proprrty, and to invest and reinvest and to 
clrnnge the investments thereof in as free and ample a manner 
as I could do if living. And I do also ex1wessl~· authorize and 
empow(\r my said Executor and/or Trustee to lease, exchange, 
option, sell and convey, the whole or mi:v portion of my real 
estate, upon sueh terms ancl conditions, and either privately 
or publicly, as it may deem best, and to execute nnd deliver 
all such eonveyance~ and other instruments as mav be deemed 
necessary anci proper to effectuate any such leas'o, exchan:(e, 
option or sale, and to receive the proceeds and/or avails of 
any such transaction and to .inve~t, re-invest and change the 
investments thereof, in as free and ample a manner as I could 
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do if living; and ;ny lessee, purchaser or grantee of ~my suclt 
real estate, or of any such personal property shall be in no 
wise obligated or required to see to the application of the 
proceeds and/or avails arising or derived from any such dis-
position thereof. 
page 15 r ARTICLE VII In anv case jn which mv Execu-
tor or my sai<l Trustee "'is required, in piirsuance 
of the provisions of this my will, to divide my estate or said 
trust estate, or any portion thereof, into parts or shares, or 
to distribute the same, I do authorize and empower my said 
Executor and/or Trustee, in its discretion, to make such di-
vision or distribution in kind, or partly in kind and partly in 
·money; and, for the pmpose of such allotment or distribu-
tion, the judgment of my said Executor or Trustee, concern-
ing· the propriety thereof, ::tnd the respective values, shall be 
binding and conclusive upon all persons interested in any such 
allotment or distribution. 
IN "WITNESS vVHER,EO~-\ I have on this the 30th day 
July, 1932, signed, sealed, published and declared, the fore-
g·oing instrume11t ns and for my last will and testament. 
RAWLEY H. FULLER (Seal) 
Signed, sealed, published and declared, by the above named 
testator, Rawley H. Fuller, as and for his last will and testa-
ment, in our presence, and in the presence of each other, who~ 
at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of each 
other, have hereunto subscribed our names as attesting wit-
nesses: 
Virginia= 
MAR.Y J. FORD 
NANNIE L. ·woLTZ 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
on Tuesday, .July 27th, 1943, at 3 o'clock P. M., before the 
undersigned E. C.- Lacy, Clerk: 
A paper writing bearing date the 30th day of July, 1932, 
and purporting to be the last will and testament of Rawley 
H. Fuller, deceased, was this day produced for probate be-
fore me, E. C. Lacy, Clerk, by F. A. w· addell, Assistant Treas-
urer of Virginia Trust Company of Richmond, Va., the execu-
tor named in said will, and proved by the oaths of Mary J~ 
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Ford and Nannie L. "'\Y oltz, the two subscribing witnesse~ 
thereto, who testified under oath that they witnessed the sig-
nature of the testator to said paper writing at his request and 
in his presence and in the presence of each other, they all 
three being together and signing and seeing each sign at the 
same time, and they further testified under oath that at the 
time of so signing said pa per writing- they believed 
page 16 ~ the testator to be of sound a.nd disposing mind an<l 
memory. Which paper writing· is admitted to rec-
ord as the true last will and testament of Dr. Rawlev H. Ful-
ler, deceased. On the motion of the Virginia Trust Company 
of Riehmond, Virginia, it is permitted to qualify as Executor 
under his will of the estate of said Rawley H. Fuller, de-
ceased; thereupon the said Virginia Trust Company by F. A. 
"Waddell, Its Asst. Treasurer, came befor·e me, E. C. Lacy, 
Clerk, in said Clerk's Office and qualified as such, by taking· 
the oaths prescribed by law and entered into and acknowl-
edged a bond in the penalty of ($75,000.00) Seventy-Five 
Thousand Dollars, conditioned according to law. A certifi-
cate is granted the Virginia Trust Company for obtaining 
probate of said will in due form. It is ordered that R. 1\1. Fel-
ton, R. E. Ingram, R. C. Overbey, Dr. "'\Y. L. Eastlack and 
R. A. Leggett, or any three of them, being first duly s,vorn 
for the purpose, do truly and justly appraise in current money 
the personal estate of Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, and also 
any real estate which the personal representative is author-
ized by' the will to sell, or of which it is authorized to receive 
the rents and profits, and return their appraisemcnt under 
their hands as the law directs. 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
A Copy, Teste : 
E. C. LA.CY, Clerk 
State of Virginia, 
County of Halifax, to-wit: 
I, E. C. Lacy, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Halifax County, 
Virginia, do hereby certify that the foreg·oing is a true and 
correct copy of the will of Rawley H. Fuller, probated in thif5 
office on July 27th, 1943, and recorded in vVill Book 47, at 
page 553. 
Given under my hand and seal this 6th day of December; 
1943. 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
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County of Halifax, to-wit: 
I, E. C. Lacy, Clerk of said County, and of the Circuit 
Court held in and for said County, being a Coui't of Record,. 
having a seal, do hereby certify that on the :27th day of July,. 
194:3, nrgiuia Trust Company of the City of Richmond, Va., 
was duly appointed Executor under bis will of the estate of 
Dr. Hawley H. Fuller deceased, and qualified in said Court 
by taking the oaths required by law and executing a bond in 
the penalty of ($75,000.00) 8eventy-Five Thousand Dollars, 
conditioned according to law, with surety deemed sufficient. 
This is to fnrtlier certify that at this time said Virginia 
Trust Company of City of Richmond, Va., has full authority 
a1.nd power as such. In tc:;;tirnou~· whereof I have hereunto 
!,;Ct my name and amxed tlie seal of said Circuit Court, at 
Halifax, Halifax County, Virginia, this the 6th day of De-
cen1ber, 1D43. 
E. C. LACY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County,. 
in the State of Virginia 
Circuit Court, Halifax 
County, Va. 
Exl1ibit B with Bill. 
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PR-AISE!i.IEXT. · 
Virginia: 
In the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Conntv 
of Halifax, Va. the 27th day of .July, 1943. "' 
It Is Ordered Thnt R,. M. Felton, H. E. Ingram, R. C. Over-
bey, Dr. ·w. L. Eastlack and R. A. Leggett, or any three of 
them, being· first duly sworn for the purpose, do truly and 
justly· appraise in cu r1·cmt money the personal estate of Raw-
ley II. Fuller, deceasc~d, and also any real estate which the 
r>ersonal representative is authorized by the will to sell, or ·Of 
which lte is autl1orizcd to receive the rents and profits, and 
return their appl'ab,crncnt under their hands as the law di-
rects .. 
A Copy, Teste: 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
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State of Virginia, 
County of Halifax, to-wit: 
This day before me, "\V. B. Settle, a Notary Public for the 
County aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, personally ap-
peared H,. l\L ~,elton, R. E. Ingram, Dr. W. L. Eastlack, R. A. 
Leg-g·ett and R. C. Overbey, the appraisers named in the fore-
going order, and made oath that they would truly and justly 
appraise such personal estate .of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, de-
ceased, as mig·ht he produced to them, and also any real estate 
which the personal representative is authorized by the will to 
sell, or of which he is authorized to receive tlie rents and 
profits, and return their appraisement under their hands as 
the law directs. 
Given under my hand this 28th day of July, 1943. J\'Iy com-
mission expires 3/19 /194.J. 
"\V. B. SETTLE, 
Notary Public 
Cash on deposit in Citizens Bank of So. Boston-
R. I-I. Fuller-personal 
Cash on deposit South Boston Bank & Trust Co .. 
-R. H. Fuller-Farm account 
Cash on deposit South Boston Bank & Trust Co. 
-Account South Bostqn Hospital 
page 1.9 r Promissory note "\\T. Allen Fuller-
Face value $800.00 
Promissory note Andrew 1\foCraw-Face value 
$800.00 
6 shares stock So. Boston Factory Corp-No 
value-common 
40 shares Riverview Realty Corp.-Common 
1 share Halifax County Golf Club-Common 
l share Va. Public Service Co. Pfd. 6% 
6 bonds South Boston Factory Corp.-5%-of 
face value of $600.00 · 
$5,050 face value U. S. Savings bonds E. 
$2,000 face value U. S. Savings bonds G. 
$1,:WO face value U.S. Tax notes ser. A. 
Ins. policy Reliance Life 698116-payable to es-
tate 
Ins. policy Reliance Life 387104-payable to es-
tate 
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Ins. policy Reliance Life 625522-payable to es-
tate 
Ins. policy Metropolitan 5784976-payable to es-
tate 
Ins. policy Metropolitan 5784975-payable to es-
tate 
Hospital equipment and furni tnre 
Household and kitchen furniture-home 
1 Lincoln Zephyr-1941 model 
One-half interest in 307 acres near Clover, Va., 
known as Garrett farm 
So. Boston Hospital building- & lot on l\!Iaiu St., 
So. Boston, Va. 











We, the undersigned, R. M. Felton, R. A. Leggett, R. C. 
Overbey, R. E. Ingram, Dr. ,V. L. Eastlack, three of the ap-
praisers appointed by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Halifax by order entered on the 27th day of July,. 
1943, to appraise the estate of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, de-
ceased., having been first duly sworn, have appraised such 
personal estate as was produced to us, and such 
page 20 ~ real estate as the personal representative is au-
thorized bv the will to sell or of which he is au-
thorized to receive the i·ents and profits, and herewith return 
the foregoing as our appraisement thereof. 
R.M.FELTON 
R. E. ING RAIVI 
R. A. LEGGETT 
R. C. OVERBEY 
W. LLOYD EASTL.A.CK 
Appraisers 
This is to certify that the foregoing appraisement embraces 
all of the estate, real and personal, that has come to my knowl-
edge or possession, or which is subject to my authority, in mv 
fiduciary capacity as Executor of the estate of Rawley Ii. 
Fuller, deceased. 
VIRGINIA TRUST COMP ANY 
By: F. A. WADDELL 
Asst. Treas. 
Corrie A. Fuller v. Virginia Trust Co., etc., et als. 43 
Inspected, found to be in proper form, and approved this 
9th day of August, 1943. 
HEXRY "\V. McLAUGHLIN 
Com 'r of Accts 
Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of tlle Circuit Court of the County of 
Halifax on the 10th clay of August., 1943. 
The foregoing Inventory and Appraisement of the estate of 
Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, was· this day received and ad-
mitted to record. · 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
Recorded in ·wm Book 43, page 591. 
A Copy, Teste: 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
Exhibit C with Bill. 
page 21 } CORRIE A. FULLER-RENUNCIATION. 
Know all men by these presents, that whereas Rawley H. 
Fuller, of Halifax County, Virginia, parted this life on the 
24th day of July, 1943., seised and possessed of real and per-
sonal estate; and, whereas, the said Rawley H. Fuller in llis 
lifetime made his last will and testament according to law, 
which has been probated before the Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of said County on the 27th day of July, 1943, and recorded 
in the Clerk's Office of Halifax County, Virg·inia, in ·win. 
Book No. 47, page 553, reference to which said will is here 
made for the terms, conditions, devises and legacies therein 
contained; and, whereas, I, Corrie A. Fuller, widow of Raw-
ley H. Fuller, deceased, am the devisee and legatee mentioned 
in the clauses and provisions of the said will and desire to 
waive and renounce the same; NOW, THEREFOR.E, I, COR-
RIE A. FULLER, widow of the said Rawler H. Fuller., de-
ceased, and of Halifax County, Virginia, do hereby waive 
and renounce the said clauses and provisions of the said will 
of Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, and elect to claim such share 
by way of dower and distribution of my said husband's es-
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tate, real, personal and mixed, as I would have had if he had 
died intestate. ":-ITNESS mv hand and seal this the 13th 
day of August, of the yonr 1943. · 
CORRIE A. FULLER (Seal} 
State of Virginia, 
County of Halifax, to-wit: 
I, .Agues ·w eathcrford, a Notary Public in and for the-
County and State aforesaid, do· certify that Corrie A. Fuller,. 
whose name is signed to the writing above bearing· date on 
the 13th day of August, 1943, has acknowledged the same be-
fore me in mv county and state aforesaid. 
Given under my h·aud this 13th day of August, 1943. 
AGXES"'\VEATHERFORD 
Notary Public 
~Iy commission expires October 4th, 1945. 
The within written renunciation was presented in the-
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Vir-
ginia, on the 14th day of August, 1943, at 9 o'clock A. M., and 
upon the certificate of acknowledgment thereon endorsed ad-
mitted to record according to law. 
E. 0. LACY, Clerk 
A Copy, Teste: 
E. 0. LACY, Clerk 
Exhibit C-1 with Bill. 
page 22 ~ WILLIAl\I A. JfcOANLESS, JR., &O., TO COR-
R.IE ALLEN FULL~JR DEED B. & S. $8,500.00-
-D. B. 157., P. 199. 
THIS DEED Made this the 19th day of May, 1938, between 
\\7illiam A. McCanless, Jr. and Katherine S. :rvrcCanless, his 
wife, parties of the first part, and Corrie Allen Fuller, party 
qf the second part, "'\VITNESSETH: That for and in con-
sideration of the sum of Eig·ht Thousand and Five Hundred 
($8,500.00) Dollars cash in hand paid by the party of the sec-
ond part to the parties of the first part at and l)efore the 
sealing and delivery of this deed the receipt whereof is here-
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by acknowledged, the said "\Villiam A. McCanless., Jr., and 
Katherine S. :McCanless do grant, bargain, sell and convey 
with general warranty of title unto the said Corrie Allen 
Fuller all of that certain lot or parcel of land together with 
the irnJJrovements thereon and appurtenances thereunto be-
longing, situated in the town of South Boston, Halifax County, 
Virginia, lying and being on the cast side of vVashington 
Street iu said town and described as Lot #10 on the 'plat of 
the subdivision of the Joseph Stebbins Estate, recorded in 
Halifax Clerk's Office in plat book 1, page 122, said lot fronts 
50 feet on "\Vasbington Street and extends back 162.8 feet on 
the north side and 161.4 feet on the south side., and is in all 
respects the identical real estate acquired by ,,7illiam A. Mc-
Canless, Jr., from J. M. Coleman and Mary P. Coleman, his 
wife, by deed dated March 18, 1932, and recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of Halifax County, Virginia, in D. B. 146, Page 
437, to which deed reference is hereby made for a more com-
plete and accurate description. The parties of the first part 
covenant that they are seized in fee simple of the property 
hereby conveyed, and have a right to convey the same to the 
aforesaid grantee, that they have <lone no act to encumber 
the same, that the gTantee shall have quiet and peaceable 
possession thereof free from all encumbrances, and that they 
the gTantors will execute such other and further assurances 
of title as may be requisite and necessary. "\\7ITNESS the 
following signatures and seals: 
WILLL.\.11 A. :McCANLESS, JR. (Seal) 
KATHERINE S. McCANLESS (Seal) 
Exhibit D with Bill. 
page 23 ~ State ~f Virginia, 
County of Halifax, to-wit: 
I, N. P. Loftis, a Notary Public of and for the county of 
Halifax, in the State of Virginia, do certify that William A. 
M:cCanless., ,Jr., and Katherine S. l\foCanless, his wife, whose 
names are signed to the foregoing deed bearing date of May 
19, 1938, have each acknowledged the same before me in my 
county and state aforesaid. Given under my hand this the 
27 day of May, 1938. 
N. P. LOFTIS, 
Notary Public 
:My commissi~m expires on the 25 day of January, 1942. , 
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. . 
The within written deed was presented in the Clerk's Office 
of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Virginia, on the 28 
day of May, 1938, at 11 :15 o'clock A. M., and upon the cer-
tificate of acknowledgment thereon endorsed admitted to rec-
ord according to law. 
Documentary Stamps attached and cancelled-$8.50. 
page 24 ~ 
Virginia: 
E. C. LACY., Clerk 
A Copy, Teste: 
E. C. LACY., Clerk 
Exhibit E with Bill. 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County, October 15th, 1943. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als~ 
v. 
Virginia Trust Company, et als. 
FINAL DECREE. 
THIS DAY came the complainants, by counsel, and moved 
the Court to allow them to file an amended bill, which motion 
having been maturely considered by the Court, is refused, to 
which action of the Court., complainants, by counsel, object 
and except. And now this cause, which has been regularly 
matured and set for hearing at rules, came on this day to be 
heard on the bill of complaint; the answer of T. C. Watkins, 
.Jr., the petition and answer of I. K. Briggs; the answer of 
the Virginia Trust Company, Executor of the will of R. H. 
Fuller; the answer of James· E. Edmunds, guardian ad lit em. 
for the infant defendant; g·eneral replication to each of said 
answers ; upon the evidence taken in open court in the pres-
ence of said guardian ad Utem, and was argued by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, it appearing to the Court that 
the complainant, Corrie A. Fuller, bas renounced the provi-
sions made for her in the will of her husband, the late R.H. 
Fuller, and elected to take her dower in his real estate and 
her distributive share in llis personal estate in accordance 
with the statutes for such cases made and provided, and the 
Court being· of the opinion that she has the right to institute 
such proceedings as she may deem proper to have her dower 
Corrie A. Fuller v. Virginia Trust Co., etc., et als. 4 7 
assigned to her, and that therefore no injunction is necessary 
or proper to protect her rights in respect of her said dower 
on the ground that such rights will be, or have been disposed 
of by the executor of R. H. Fuller's will, doth so decide; and 
the Court being further of the opinion that the conduct of 
the executor of the will of R. H. Fuller and T. C. ·watkins, 
Jr., in entering into the contract for the sale and purchase 
of the property known as the South Boston Hospital, includ-
ing the real estate and personal property and 
page 25 ~ equipment used in connection therewith, was not 
actually or constructively fraudulent on the part 
of either of them, cloth so decide., and doth adjudge, order and 
decree that the restraining order heretofore entered in this 
cause be, and the same is hereby dissolved, and that com-
plainants' bill be, and the same is hereby dismissed, but with-
out prejudice to the rights of the complainant, Corrie A. Ful-
ler, to institute such proceedings as she may be advised are 
proper for the reovery and assignment of her dower in tho 
real estate of which her husband died sized and possessed, and 
such proceeding·s as she may be advised are rig'11t and proper 
in connection with her rights as distributee of her husband's 
, personal estate, and without prejudice to the rights of the 
executor or any other devisee of the late R. H. Fuller to in-
stitute such proceedings as they may be advised are right 
and proper in connection with their rights as such executor 
and devisees in the real and personal estate of the late R. H. 
Fuller, which have not been litigated and decided in this suit~ 
A Copy, Teste : 
E. C. LACY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax 
County, Virginia. 
page 26 ~ Virginia Trust Co. Executor 
v. 
Corrie A. F_nller, et als. 
ANS.WER OF GUARDIAN .AD LI.TEM. 
THE ANSWER OF Mary Anne Fuller, who being an in-
fant, answers by James E. Edmunds, her guardian arl litem, 
appointed to defend her interest in a certain suit now pend-
ing at rules in the Clerk's Office of Halifax Circuit Court-
wherein she is a party defendant, and Virginia Trust Co., 
Executor of Dr. R.H. Fuller, is party plaintiff. This respond-
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ent savhw and resc1Ti1w &c. for answer to the· bill of said 
t, ::,., ' 
complainants, or to so much thereof as she is advised it is 
material for her to answer, says that being an infant under 
21 yeai·s of age, she can neither admit nor deny the several 
allegations in said bill of complaint contained, but submits 
lier rights and interests to the protectioi1 of the court. And 
having answered fully, she prays to be hence dismissed with 
her costs, &c. 
l\IARY ANNE FULLER 
By: .J .Al\IES E. EDMUNDS 
Her Guardian acl Litern, 
I, .J amcs E. Edmunds, G uarclian ad Liteni of Mary Ann 
Fuller do cei·tify that I was duly appointed as such Guardian 
and filed her answer at 1st J-mmary Rules, 1944, Given under 
rtry lmml this 8th of ~T uly,, HJ44 . 
• J AJ\IES E. EDMUNDS. III 
Guardian ad liten·i of Mary Ann Fuller. 
In the Clerk's Office of Halifax County Circuit Court . 
. I hereby certify that James E. Edmunds personally ap-
peared before me, ,J as. II.. l\Iedley Deputy Clerk of said Court, 
ai1d made oath that the foregoing statement is true and that 
he filed his answer as Guardian a,d litem as aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this the 8th clay of July, 1944. 
J AS. H. :MEDLEY, D. Clerk. 
page 27 ~ Virgfoia: 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Jan. 20, 1944. 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee of Rawley 
H. Fuller, Deceased 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller,, et 'als. 
DECREE~ 
On motion of the def end ant, Corrie A. Fuller, she is allowed 
to file her demurrer to tho bill of complaint in this cause,. 
which is according·ly done. 
Corrie .A.. Fuller v. Virginia Trust Co., etc., et als. 49 
page 28 } In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee of -Rawley 
IL Fuller, Deceased 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, ct als. 
DEMURRER OF COR.R.IE A. FULLER. 
The defendant, Corrie A. Fuller, comes and says that Para-
graph 8, found on pages 3 and 4 of the bill of complaint., is 
insufficient at law for the following reasons: 
The bill of complaint, together with exhibits filed therewith, 
shows that Rawley H. Fuller died on July 24, 1943; that 
,vmiam A. l\foCanless, Jr., and wife conveyed the residence 
property of Corrie A. Fuller in the Town of South Boston, 
Virginia, to her on May 19, 1938; that by their deed dated 
:May 19., 1938, said gTantors conveyed to her a fee simple title 
to said property entitling her to immediate possession and 
that at the date of her husband's death she was enjoying the 
possession and ownership of said property. 
The complainant charges that by reason of tl1e payment by 
Rawley H. Fuller of the purchase price for the residence 
property conveyed by "William A. McCanless, Jr., and wife to 
defendant Corrie A. Fuller aforesaid, said conveyance created 
jointure as to wliich this defendant was required to elect, and 
that having. renounced .the provisions of the will of Rawley 
H. Fuller for her benefit she is required to convev her said 
residence property to complainant as Executor and Trustee 
under said ,vill. This charge is based upon Virginia Code 
Sections 5120 and 5121 and must necessarily be controlled by 
them. Said conveyance, under the circumstances alleged in 
the bill, does not meet the requirements of Virginia Code Sec-
t.ions 5120 and 5121, and did 11ot create jointure requiring 
this defendant to elect to accept either her said 
page 29 ~ residence property in lieu of dower or to take un-
der the will and surrender said residence property, 
nor is she required after having renounced the provisions of 
the will of Rawley H. Fuller for her benefit, to convey and 
deliver possession of said residence property to his Executor 
and Trustee., the complainant in tl1is cause. 
.JAS. S. EASLEY 
EDWIN B. :MEADE 
Hel" -Attorneys 
CORRIE A. FULLER 
By Counsel 
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page 30 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
in vacation, April 26, 1944, at 9 o'clock A. M., the following 
decree was received from the judge, and recorded according 
to law, as follows, to-wit: 
Corrie A. Fuller 
v. 
Tucker C. ·watkins, Jr .. , et al. 
VACATION DECREE. 
THIS CAUSE which bas been regularly matured and set 
for hearing at rules, came on this day to be heard on the bill 
of complaint; the answer of defendants, with general replica-
tion thereto, and was argued by counsel; Upon consideration 
whereof, and it appearing to the court that there is pending 
in this court another suit under the style of Virginia Trust 
Company, Executor &c v. Corrie A. Fuller, et als., which 
seeks in part the same relief as that sought in this suit~ and 
in which it is prayed that this suit be consolidated with it and 
heard together., and the Judge being of the opinion that the 
relief soug·bt in this suit can be better and more advanta-
geously administered in the other, it is therefore adjudged, or-
dered and decreed, that the proceedings in this cause be 
stayed, and tl1at it be brought on for hearing with the afore-
said suit of Virginia Trust Company, Executor &c. v. Corrie 
.A. Fuller, et als. 
Given under my hand this the 25th day of April, 1944. 
HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge designate 
To the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County: 
Please enter the foregoing in vacation. 
Truly Recorded, Teste : 
HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge designate 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
Bill of Mrs. Corrie A. Fuller filed in her suit, and consoli-
date with the suit as above. . . 
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page 31 ~ In the Circuit Court of Halifax County,, Virginia. 
Corrie .A. Fuller 
v. 
T. C. Watkins, Jr. and I. K. Briggs 
BILL OF COi\IPLAINT. 
(1) Your complainant respectfully represents unto your 
Honor that she is the widow of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, who 
died testate in South Boston, Halifax County, Virginia, on 
~July 24, 1943, leaving surviving him besides your complain-
ant, bis widow., the following children: Rawley H. Fuller, 
Jr., William Allen Fuller, Sarah F. Hudgins, aild :Mary Anne 
Fuller, an infant adopted daughter; that his last will anu 
testament dated July 30, 1932, was probated before the Clerk 
of this Court on July 27, 1943, and is duly recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of Halifax County in ,vm Book 47, page 553, 
a copy of which is filed with the Bill of Complaint as '' Ex-
hibit Will" to be read as a part hereof; that the Virginia 
Trust Company, a Virginia corporation with its principal 
office in the City of Richmond, Virginia, was named as execu-
tor and trustee under said will and qualified as such at the 
time the same was probated; that of the estate of which the 
said Rawley H. Fuller died seized and possessed the principal 
item was the South Boston Hospital, which consisted of a 
lot on Upper Main Street in the Town of South Boston 011 
which there stands a modern, well equipped hospital, and that 
with the exception of the above named piece of property the 
only real estate of which the said Rawley H. Fuller died 
seised and possessed was a one-half interest in a farm in 
Halifax County of little value. 
(2) That by writing dated Aug·ust 13, 1943, and duly re-
corded in the Clerk's Office of Halifax County, Virginia., on 
Ang·ust 14, 1943, your complainant renounced the 
page 32 ~ provisions of the aforesaid will for her benefit and 
elected to claim her share in the estate of the said 
Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, by way of dower and distribution 
of his estate, real, personal and mixed, as she ,v·ould have had 
he died intestate. · 
(3) That almost immecliateiy following the death of the 
said Rawley H. Fuller the Virginia Trust Comnany, acting 
under the power given to it under the termc: of the aforesnid 
will, without consulting with complainant, op<mecl ~1egotiatiom; 
for the sale of the said hospital property, and thut without 
the consent and contrary to the wishes of your complainant 
the said Virginia Trust Company as Executor and Trustee of 
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Rawley· H. Fuller executed, with special warranty of title, a 
deed dated October , 1943, and recorded in the current deed 
book of Halifax County, Virginia, on the day of October., 
1943, conveying the said hospital property and equipment to 
Tucker C. W"" atkins, Jr. mid I. K. Briggs for the sum of 
$40,000 cash. 
( 4) Your complainant is advised and therefore avers that 
the Virginia Trust Company as Executor and Trustee of Raw-
ley H. Fuller, deceased, had no right or authority to deprive 
her of her do-\ver rights in the said hospital and lot conveyed 
aforesaid; that said conveyance of said hospital and lot was 
made subject to her dower rights; and that she has the right 
to have her dower in said property assigned in this cause. 
(5) Your complainant alleges that her dower cannot be laid 
off in kind in the real estate conveyed by the aforesaid deed 
aml that pursuant to the provisions of Section 5121 of the 
Code of Virginia, she is entitled to a decree requiring T. C . 
.. Watkins, Jr. and I. K. Brigg;s, assignees of Virginia Trust 
Compan:'", to whom said property was devised as the Execu-
tor and Trustee of Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, to pay to com-
plainant during· lier life and on such terms and in such install-
ments as the Court may deem proper what may be 
page 33 ~ ascertained by inquiry to be the fair net annual 
value of such proportional part of said real estate 
as she would be entitled to have for her life as tenant in clower,t 
and that she is also entitled to have the payment of such net 
annual value secured hv a lien on all of said real estate em~ 
braced in the aforesaici conyeyance to be enforceahle in this 
suit in case of default in the payments determined. 
V{herefore, being remediless in the premises save in a court 
of equity where such matters are properly cog·nizable, your 
complainant prays that T. C. " 7atkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs 
nm)'" be made parties defendant to this bill and required to 
answer the same but not under oath, the oath being hereby 
expressly waived; that complainant's dower in the real estate 
eonveyed in the aforesaid deed may be assigned; that if it 
shall appear to the satisfaction of the Court that dower can-
not be laid off in kind, it may be ascertain~d by proper inquiry 
what amount will represent the fair net annual value of such 
proportional part of said real estate as complainant would be 
entitled to have for her life as tenant in dower; and that the 
Court may require the defendants to pay said amount on such 
terms and in such installments as it may deem proper, and 
that said real estate may be impressed with a lien as security 
for the payment of the amount so determined; and that com-
plainant may have all sucll other and further and general re-
Corrie A. Fuller v. Virgfoia Trust Co., etc., et als. 53 
lief in the premises as the nature of her case may require or 
to equity may seem meet. 
And complainant will ever pray, etc. 
CORRIE A. FULLER 
By Counsel 
JAS. S. EASLEY 
ED"\VIN B. :MEADE, p. q. 
page 34 } Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
Corrie A. Fuller., Plaintiff 
v. 
T. C. ·watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs, Defendants 
THE JOINT ANS\VER OFT. C. "\VATKINS, JR., AND 
I. K. BRIGGS. 
These respondents, reserving to themselves all just excep-
tions to a Bill of Complaint filed against them in the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Virginia, by 
Corrie A. Fuller, for answer thereto or to so much thereof 
as they arc advised that they should answer, answer and 
say: 
(1) These respondents admit tlie death of Dr. Rawley H. 
Fuller., and that the Virginia Trust Company qualified on his 
said estate as Executor, but these respondents are not fully 
advised as to the extent or value of the property of Dr. Raw-
ley H. Fuller and call for strict proof thereof; and 
(2) Your respondents admit the alleg·ation of Item #2 of 
the Bill of Complaint to the effect that Corrie A. Fuller by a 
writing· dated Aug-ust 13, 1943, recorded in the Clerk's Office 
of Halifax County, Va., August 14, 1948, renounced the pro-
vision made for her in the Will of the late Dr. Rawley H. Ful-
ler for her benefit, but these respondents deny the conclusion 
of said paragraph #2 of the '.Bill of Complaint alleging that 
Corrie A. Fuller elected to claim ber dower in the estate of 
the said Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, or <listributivc share 
therein ; and 
(3) These respondents deny the allegation of paragraph 
#3 of the Bill of Complaint., and ·c1eny that it is pertinent or 
relevant to this issue, except these respondents admit pur-
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chasing the South Boston Hospital real estate and 
page 35 r equipment at the price of $40,000.00, and admit re-
ceiving deed as therein alleged; and 
(4) These respondents deny the allegations of paragraph 
#4 of the Bill of Complaint; and 
(5) These respondents deny the allegation of paragraph 
#5 of the Bill of Complaint to the effect that the complainant 
bas a dower interest in the hospital property. 
These respondents for furtlier answer to the aforesaid Bill 
of Complaint, answer and say: 
That Corrie A. Fuller, complainant., received as a jointure 
from Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, which he, Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, 
caused to be conveyed to the complainant, Corrie A. Fuller,. 
by deed dated May 19, 1938, a valuable lot and residence on 
"\Vashington Street, in the town of South Boston, Virginia., 
which said residence was elaborately and expensively fur-
nished and equipped by the said Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, and 
which said property was received by the said Corrie A. Ful-
ler, and was in its entirety intact, and no part of said prop-
erty, real or personal, had been spent or wasted a.t the time 
of the death of the Raid Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, and said prop-
erty has been exclusively used and enjoyed by the said Corrie 
A. Fuller since the death of the said Dr. Rawley H. Fuller; 
that the complainant, Corrie A. Fuller, has failed to surren-
der or relinquish said W ashingtoh Street property to the es-
tate of the said Dr. Rawley H. Fuller., and by her act has 
elected to hold as jointure the aforesaid property, and is there-
fore barred from dower in the South Boston Hospital prop-
erty. 
These respondents further answer and say that the Vir-
g-inia Trust Company, Executor of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, were 
authorized by the ·wm under which they were acting to sell 
and convey the real estate of which the said Dr. Rawley H. 
Fuller died seized and possessed as fully and completely as 
the said Dr. Rawley H. Fuller could do if living; 
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Executor of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, sold under con-
tract the South Boston Hospital, real and personal, to these 
respondents at the price of $40,000.00 prior to the renuncia-
tion of said ·wm by Corrie A. Fuller, and that pursuant to the 
said contract the said Virginia Trust Co. Executor of Dr. 
Rawley H. Fuller., later conveyed by a deed duly recorded in· 
the Clerk's Office of Halifax County, Virginia, the said South 
Boston Hospital property to these respondents. These re-
spondents answer and say that should the said Corrie A. Ful-
• 
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ler be allowed to surrender her jointure to the estate and re-
elect to take dower in the estate of the said Dr. Rawlev H. 
Fuller, that the said estate, including the said jointure," will_ 
consist of a large amount of good and valuable real estate out 
of which dower should be assigned to the said Corrie A. Ful-
ler, leaving the South Boston Hospital Property, which has 
been sold as aforesaid, free of her dower or any encumbrance . 
. These respondents deny that the complainant is entitled to 
any relief whatsoever prayed for in the Bill of Complaint. 
These respondents are further advised and answer and say 
that there is depending in the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
Va., a separate suit under the style of the Virg·inia Trust 
Company v. Corrie A. Fuller., et als., the purpose of which 
is to assign dower and other general relief, to the said Corrie 
A. Fuller, and that in order to save litigation that the afore-
said suit and this suit should be combined and heard to-
gether. 
And now having fully answered, these respondents pray to 
be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs on this behalf 
expended. 
T. C. WATKINS, JR. 
Respondent 
I. K. BRIGGS 
Respondent 
By ... Counsel 
HENRY W. McLAUGHLIN, JR., and 
TUCK & MITCHELL, p. d. 
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In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
in vacation, April 26, 1944., at 9 o'clock A. M., the following 
decree was received from the judge, and recorded according· 
to law, as follows, to-wit: 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor, &c. 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als. 
VACATION DECREE. 
THIS CAUSE which has been regularly matured and set 
for hearing as to all parties at rules, came on this day to be 
heard on ·the bill of complaint and exhibits therewith filed; 
the answer of Mary Anne Fuller, the infant defendant., by 
• 
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her guardian ad litem duly- appointed to defend her inter-
ests herein; and upon the demurrer of the defendant, Corrie 
A. Fuller, to a part of the said bill of complaint . 
. A.nd said demurrer having been fully argued by counsel on 
the 5th day of April, 1944, and the Judge having taken time 
to consider of his judgment thereon, and now having maturely 
considered the same, is of the opinion, for reasons set forth 
in a memorandum filed in the papers of this cause and made 
a part thereof, to overrule said demurrer, and doth therefore 
adjudge, order and decree that the same be, and is hereby 
overruled. 
And it appearing· to the ,Judge that the matters presented 
for decision in this caRe should be determined as speedily as 
possible, the Court doth adjudg·e, order and decree, that all 
defendants, other than the infant, (her answer being already 
filed by her guardian a.d litem,), file their answers herein with 
twenty-five days from the date of the entry of this decree, 
if thev be so advised and desire to answer the bill of com-
plaint' herein. 
Given under my hand tliis the 25th day of April, 1944. 
HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge, desig·nate 
To the Clerk of the Circuit Court. of Halifax County: 
Please enter the foreg·oing as a vacation decree. 
Truly Recorded, Teste : 
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HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge, designate· 
E. C. LA.CY, Clerk 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
in vacation, May 9, 1944, at 9 o'clock A. M., the following· 
decree was received from the judge, and recorded according~ 
to law, as follows, to-wit: 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee of Rawley 
II. Fuller,, Deceased 
v-. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als. 
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DECREE. 
On motion of Corrie A. ~,uller, one of the defendants in 
the above styled cause, she is allowed to file her separate 
answer to the bill of complaint, which is accordingly done. 
Given under my hand this 8th day of May, 1944. 
To E. C. Lacy, Esq., Clerk: 
, Pl enter the foregoing in vacation. 
Truly Recorded, Teste: 
HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge 
HENRY C. LEIGH 
Judge 
E. C. LA.CY, Clerk 
page 39 ~ In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
Virg·inia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee of Rawley 
H. Fuller, Deceased, &c. 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als. 
SEPARATE ANS-WER OF CORRIE A. FULLER. 
Respondent Corrie A. Fuller, without waiving the benefit 
of l1er objections to the action of the Court in overruling her 
· demurrer to a part of the bill of complaint filed in the above 
styled cause but reserving unto herself all proper exceptions 
thereto, for answer ~o said bill of complaint, replies and says: 
1. The allegations of Paragraph 1 of the bi11 to the effect 
that the complainant is a Virginia Corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in the City of Richmond, and with au-
thority to act in a fiduciary capacity, are admitted. 
2. The allegations of Parag-raph 2 of the bill to the effect 
that Rawley H. Fuller,, a resident of Halifax County, Vir-
ginia, died testate, and by his will named the complainant as 
sole Executor and Trustee, are admitted, and it is likewise ad-
mitted that "Exhibit A" filed with the bill is a copy of the 
last will and testament of Rawley H. Fuller, dated July 30, 
1932. 
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3. The alleg·ations of Paragraph 3 of the bill correctly name 
the widow and four children of Rawley H. Fuller and it is 
true that they are the sole beneficiaries named in his will. 
4. The allegations of Paragraph 4 of the bill to the effect 
that the complainant has qualified as Sole Executor of the 
estate of Rawley H. Fuller are admitted. 
5. It is admitted that five appraisers of the estate of Raw-
ley H. Fuller were appointed by the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of Halifax County; that these five appraisers met, in-
ventoried, and appraised his estate; that "Exhibit C with 
the Bill'' is a copy of the appraisement. Respondent denies 
that by reason of supervening circumstances said 
page 40 ~ inventory and appraisement is incorrect as to the 
value placed upon the tangible personal property 
of Rawley H. Fuller, and further denies that part of the alle-
g·ations of Paragraph 5 of the bill which states that the resi-
dence property of respondent, conveyed to her by William A. 
McCanless., Jr., and wife by deed dated May 19, 1938, is a 
part of the estate of Rawley H. Fuller and should have been 
inc.Iuded in s~id inventory and appraisement. 
6. It is admitted as alleg·ed in Paragraph 6 of the bill, that 
the personal property of the decedent is amply sufficient to 
discharge all debts, taxes and testamentary expenses of the 
estate without 1·esort to the real estate. 
Respondent in reply to the other allegations of Paragraph 
6, states that decedent devised to the Virgfoia Trust Com-
pany as Executor and Trustee his real estate consisting of 
the real property in South Boston, Virginia, used as a hospi-
tal, and his undivided interest in farm lands situate near 
Clover, to be held upon the trust established in his said will, 
subject to respondent's dower therein, so that the title of the 
complainant is subject to said dower rig·hts. 
7. The allegations of Paragraph 7 to the effect that this 
respondent by writing dated August 13, 1943., renounced the 
provisions of tl,e will of Rawley H. Fuller and elected to 
claim dower in his real estate and her distributive share in 
· the personal property of her deceased husband as provided 
by statute, are admitted. · 
Respondent denies the charge and allegation in said para-
graph that by reason of said election, it became and is now 
her duty to surrender and deliver to the complainant all 
household furniture and effects, jewelry, wearing apparel,. 
and automobiles which were alleged by the complainant to 
have been left in her possession or delivered to 
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Rawley H. Fuller. Complainant in reply to this 
allegation, states that the household furniture and effects and 
Corrie A. Fuller v. Virginia Trust Co., etc., et als. 59 
jewelry located at her residence property in the Town of 
South Boston are her own property and had been in her 
possession prior to the death of her husband; that part of 
said household fumiture and effects had been acquired by 
her from her own ancestral family and tllat the remainder 
was given to her by her husbancf in his lifetime; that the 
said Rmvley H. Fuller left no jewelry of any value except a 
watch; that one of the two automobiles mentioned in the alle-
gations of said paragraph was sold by Rawley H. Fuller, in 
llis lifetime and that the other was delivered to Rawley H .. 
Fuller, ,Jr., who drove it buck to his home after attending his 
father's funeral; that complainant has neither of said auto-
mobiles in her possession nor has she received any part of 
the proceeds therefrom. 
Respondent also denies the charge and alleg·ation that she 
is duty bound to convey to the complainant as Trustee under 
the will of Rawley II. FulleT subject to her, dower right., her 
residence property conveyed to her in the lifetime of Rawley 
H. Fuller and alleged to have been purchased with his money. 
It is true that she has not conveyed said property to the com-
plainant and it is denied that said property was conveyed to 
her for her jointure and in lieu of dower. 
8. It is admitted that "William A. :McCanless, .Jr., and wife 
by deed dated l\Iay 19, 1938, conveyed to this respondent for 
a consideratio11 of $8,500.00 cash, her residence property sit-
uate on "\Yashington Street in the Town of South Boston, 
Virg'inia, fully described in said Paragraph 8 of the bill. 
. It is also admitted that ·said real estate was purchased by 
Rawley H. Fuller; that sr..icl deed of May 19, 1938, was made to 
her at his direction and that he paid the equivalent of the en-
tire consideration for said propertv out of his own 
page 42 ~ funds, but it is denied that Rawley iI. Fuller caused 
the conveyance of said real estate to be made to 
respondent intending the same to be for her jointure and in 
lieu of dower in his estate. Respondent states that said resi-
dence property was given to her by her said husband as a 
gift and that this fact was made known to members of her 
family at the time tliat said real estate was conveyed to her; 
that while said deed recited a cash consideration of $8,500.0D, 
only $2,500.00 was paid by Rawley H. Fuller out of his own 
funds upon the delivery of said deed; that the balance of said 
purchase price was paid with a loan obtain~cl throug-h First 
Federal Savings & Loan Association of South Boston, Vir-
~jnia, the payment of which was secured by a deed of trust 
from this respondent and lwr husband to Frank L. McKinnev, 
Trustee, covering her said residence property; that said loan 
was evidenced by 'one note signed by respondent as maker, 
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payable in monthly installments of $67.78; that these monthly 
installments as they became due were paid by Rawley H. Ful-
ler until on or about :May 8, 1942, at ·which time the balance 
due on said note was paid by him, and that all of said loan, in 
the amount of $6,000.00 with the exception of possibly one 
monthly installment of $67.78, was paid by Rawley I-L Fuller 
subsequent to ~T uly 22, 1938. 
Respondent further states that sbe took possession of said 
residence property upon the delivery of the -deed as and for 
. a gift from her husband and that she remained in the pos-
session and ownership of said property with the UJJderstancl-
ing that it was a gift to lier; that her husband bas never, at 
any time either before the acquisition of said residence prop-
erty or during her continued and uninterrupted possession 
and ownership up to his death, intimated in any way through 
conYersation or by ,niting, that be intended that said con-
Yeyance from ,vmiarn A. ~IcCanless., Jr., and wife to her 
should be her jointure and in lieu of dower. Respondent de-
nies that her husband had any such intention, de-
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would retain said residence property and waive 
her dower, or claim her dower and surrender said real estate,. 
and denies that upon her renunciation of the provisions made 
for her in his last will and testament, that said residence 
property became a part of his estate and that it became and 
is now her duty and obligation to return said residence prop-
erty to said estate, with only the right of dower in said prop-
erty, which was caused to be conveyed to her by her husband 
on May 19, 1938, as a g·ift. 
9. In rep1y to the allegations of Paragraph 9 of the bill, re-
spondent states that Rmvley H. Fuller died seised and pos-
sessed of real estate in the Town of South Boston known aR 
the South Boston Hospital; that complainant qualified as 
Executor under his will on July 27., 1943; that on or about 
August 7, 1943, complainant contracted to sell said South Bos-
ton Hospital and a'll hospital equipment therein, to T. 0. 
"\Vatkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs for tl1e sum of $40,000.00, pay-
able partly in cash and partly upon terms of credit; that re-
spondent on August 13, 1943, promptly after hearing of said 
sale and without notice prior thereto that the same was con-
templated., executed a writing· by ,vhich she renounced the 
provisions of t11e will of Rawley If. Fuller and elected to 
claim dower in bis real estate and her distributive share in 
his personal property and thereupon instituted a suit in the 
Circuit ·Court of Halifax ·County seeking· to enjoin the execu-
tion of · said contract and to rescind the same1 and furthe1~ 
seeking to remove from office the Virginia Trust ·Company, 
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Executor and Trustee under the w·ill of Rawley H. Fuller; 
that respondent tendered with the bill of complaint in said 
suit a bona fide offer of $50;000.00 cash for the same property 
sold by complainant to T. C. ·watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs 
for $40,000.00; that the adult children of Rawley H. Fuller, 
who are parties defendant to this cause, joined this respond-
ent in said bill of complaint in said suit instituted 
page 44 ~ immediately upon notification of the sale of said 
hospital property; that by a decree entered on Oc-
tober 15, 1'943., the court refused to grant the relief as prayed 
and dismissed the bill in said suit without prejudice to the 
parties as sho,vn by an a tfosted copy of said decree marked 
"Exhibit E with Bill". 
It is achnitted, as alleged in Paragraph 9 .of the bill, that 
on October 20, 1943, complainant as Executor and Trustee 
under the will of Rawley H. Fuller conveyed to T. C. Watkins, 
,Tr., and I. K. Brig·gs, with special ,varranty of title, the land 
and buildings comprising the South Boston Hospital and 
trans£ erred to said purchasers the personal property used in 
connection therewith, at the price of $40,000.00, which is stated 
to hav.e been paid in cash. 
It is also true that subsequent to said date of October 20, 
1943, this respondent filed in the Circuit Court of Halifax 
County her biU in equity against T. C. ·watkins, .Jr., and I. K. 
Briggs, for the purpose of having her dower in said hospital 
property assigned to her in accordance with the prayer of' 
her bill. 
10. It is admitted that complainant was not made a party 
to respondent's said suit for assignment of dower in said 
hospital property. Respondent at the time of instituting her 
suit for assignment of dower, had no reason to believe that 
the complainant could or would be chargeable with the pay-
ment of any sums which the court may therein decree to be 
paid to her in satisfaction of her said dower. Complainant 
had no right on or about August 7, 1943, to sell to said pur-
chasers said hospital property free of dower and give to them 
a complete title. The purchasers of said property were 
promptly notified of respondent's claim to dower in said prop-
erty and were made parties defendant to said suit asking for 
the rescission of said contract and thereafter, without being 
compelled to do so., completed their purchase by paying the 
purchase price and accepting· a deed to said property. Re-
spondent reiterates at this time that there is no 
page 45 r reason for including complainant as a party de-
fendant to her suit for the assig·nment of her dower 
in said hospital property. Respondent denies that the real 
estate of Rawley H. Fuller includes her residence property 
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which is referred to in Paragraph 10 of the bill as the "Home 
Property". Respondent admits that Rawley H. Fuller died 
seised and possessed of a one-half undivided interest in a 
farm of approximately 308 acres kno"wn as the Garrett Farm, 
located in Halifax County near Clover, but denies that the 
complainant bas the right to take from her any tangible per-
sonal property which she now has in her possession and which 
was in her possession at the time of her husband's death. 
11. Respondent again denies that her residence property 
referred to in Paragraph 11 of the bill as the '' Home Place'', 
is or should be included as a part of the real estate of Rawley 
H. Fuller. She again states that said residence was deeded 
to her at his direction as a gift and that she is seised and pos-
sessed of the fee simple title to this property. 
The real estate of Rawley H. Fuller included the hospital 
property in the Town of South Boston conveyed by complain-
ant to T. C. Watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs, and an one-half 
undivided interest in a. tract of land in Halifax County near 
Clover, "Virginia, containing approximately 308 acres. This 
tract of land has been sold and conveyed and one-tl1ird of the 
net proceeds therefrom accruing to the estate of Rawley H. 
Fuller has been set aside and is now held in a South Boston 
Bank to await the order of the court in this suit. 
12. Respondent in answer to the allegations of Paragraph 
12, denies the right in the complainant to treat her residence 
property as a part of the real estate of Rawley H. Fuller and 
to force upon her the sale of her own property for the alleged 
purpose of assigning dower therein to her. 
page 46 ~ Respondent is entitled to have her dower in the 
hospital property assig·ned in accordance with the 
prayer of her bill in tbe suit instituted ag·ainst T. C. \Vatkins, 
Jr .. , and I. K. Brigg·s for the purpose of assigning such dower, 
which has been consolidated with this cause and is to be heard 
with it. Respondent is also entitled to her dower in the net 
proceeds from the sale of the Garrett Farm accruing· to the 
estate of Rawlev H. Fuller. 
Complainant has no right to insist that her residence prop-
erty, a gift from her husband on May 19, 1938, shall be in-
cluded as a part of his real estate and shall be considered in 
any way as affecting or bearing upon her dower in the two 
parcels of real estate owned by him at his death, namely: the 
South Boston Hospital property and an interest in the Gar-
rett Farm. 
The sale at public auction of the Garrett Farm, according 
to the allegations of Parag;rapl1 12 of the bill, has been com-
pleted as stated aforesaid. 
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Respondent denies separately anc1 generally all of the other 
allegations of the bill not herein specifically answered. 
And now having fully answered, this respondent prays to 
be hence dismissed with her costs in this behalf expended. 
JAMES S. EASLEY 
MEADE AND TALBOTT 
Attorneys 
By EffWIN B. l\IEADE 
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CORRIE A. FULLER 
By Counsel 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee of Rawley 
H. Fuller, deceased, Plaintiff 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller., et als., Defendants 
JOINT ANS1VER OFT. C. "\\!ATKINS, JR.., AND DR. I. K. 
BRIGGS. 
The joint answer of T. C. ·watkins, Jr., and Dr. I. K. Briggs 
to the combined suits of the Virginia Trust Company, Execu-
tor and Trustee of Rawley H. Fuller, deceased, etc. v. Corrie 
A. Fuller, et als., and Corrie A. Fuller v. T. C. ·watkins, Jr. 
and I. K. Briggs. 
These respondents reserving to themselves all just excep-
tions to the Bills of Complaint filed against them in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Halifax County,, Vir-
ginia, under the short style of Virginia Trust Company, 
Executor and Trustee of Rawley H. Fuller, deceased. 1;. Cor-
rie A. Fuller, et als., and Corrie A. Fuller v. T. C. Watkins, 
Jr., and I. K. Briggs, which said suits were combined by or-
der of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Virginia, for 
answer thereto or to so much thereof as they are advised 
that they should answer, answer and say : 
These respondents filed an answer in the suit of Corrie A. 
Fuller v. T. C. Watkins, Jr., and Dr. I. K. Briggs by leave of 
court, and alleged in the aforesaid suit, and here re-alleges·, 
in these combined suits, that Corrie A. Fuller denied that 
the home on Washington Street, in the town of South Boston, 
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Virginia, is jointure, and the ref ore she lms not made an elee-
tion between her joiutu re nud dower and until such an elec-
tion is made these respondents allege that tbe said Corrie A. 
Fuller is not entitled to dower in the real estate 
page 48 ~ of which the saitl Rawley H. Fuller died seized and 
possessed. 
These respondents for fmtber ans-wcr to the aforesaid Bills 
of Complaint say: 
That if the said Corrie A. Fuller, wid°'v, elects to surrender 
her jointure and demnnd dower in the real estate of which the 
8aid Dr. Rawley H. Fuller died seized aud possessed that she 
should not in equity and good conscience be assigned dower 
in the South Boston Hospital real estate conveyed to Tucker 
C. ,Yatkins, Jr., and Dr. I. K. Briggs by the Virginia Trust 
Company, Executor of Dr·. Rtnvley II. Fuller, deceased, which 
deed of convevance is duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of 
Halifax County, Virginia, 'a copy of which is hereto attached 
marked "Exhibit A", and made a part of this answer, for the 
following reason, to-wit: 
That to assign Corrie A. Fuller, widow, dower in the South 
Boston Hospital real estate would he to divest these respond-
~nts of an interest in said property which they in good con-
science as bona fide purchasers boup;ht and paid for from tbe 
Executor and Tru~tee under the ·will of the said Dr. R. H. 
Fuller, which said Executor and Trustee had full authority 
~~nd power under said will to sell and convey said property 
as fully in every respect as if said Dr. Rawley I-I. Fuller 
~ould have done in per8on, and in addition to tbe South Boston 
Hospital property there is tl1e jointure property, which is a 
valuable residence on ,vasl1ington Street in South Boston, 
Virgfoia, and there is likewise a one-half interest in a valu-
able farm at Clover, Virginia, which is ample property in 
which the aforesaid dower can be assigned, and in addition to 
the aforesaid real estate the said Virginia Trust Company, 
Executor and Trustee, lrns in hand the sum of $40:000.00, 
which is earmarked, and which V{as paid by these respond-
ents for said hoRpital, and from which a definite sum can be 
set aside and the intere:;;t therefrom paid to the said Corrie 
A. Fuller during the period of- her natural life, and 
page 49 ~ by so doing the estate of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller 
would receive what it is entitled to and would not 
be unjustly enriched at the expense of these respondents. 
These responde11ts allege that npon the death of Dr. Raw-
ley H. Fuller the South Boston Hospital had a considerable 
number of patients confined therein, and his Executor realiz-
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ing the situation and need and demunds of these patients, and 
tbey as Executor did not have facilities to care for and assure 
competent medical treatment and nurse attention for these 
patients over an extended period of time, and being clothed 
with full authority and power to dispose of any of the real 
estate of which Dr. Hawley !I. Fuller died seized and pos-
sessed, and knowing that Corrie A. Fuller, widow, was well 
1Jrovided for by ·way of jointure and bequests., and assuming 
that Corrie A. ]-,uller would elect to take her jointure and 
the provisions made for her under the last will and testament 
of the said Rawley H. Fuller, the said Executor and Trustee 
began negotiating for a sale of the 1l0spital property; that 
in good faith and before Corrie A. Fuller had intimated that 
she would renounce the will of Dr. Rawley H. Fuller, the said 
Executor entered into a contract with Tucker C. Watkins, 
Jr., dated August 11, 1943, a copy of which is hereto attached 
as "Exhibit B ", for the sale of the South Boston Hospital 
real and personal property for a consideration of $40,000.00; 
that in reliance upon this contract and at the specific direction 
and request of the Executor under the will of Dr. Rawley H. 
Fuller, who made said request in order to protect the estate 
from any liability because of the neglect or lack of attention 
for the patients, Dr. I. K. Briggs., one of these respondents, 
moved his staff of competent nurses that he had maintained 
at the Halcyon Hospital, his patients and other equipment to 
the South Boston Hospital and took charge of the same, and 
after having been pJacecl in this position where he 
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embarrassment, and financial loss to himself, Mrs. 
Corrie A. Fuller renounced the will of her late husband, and 
undertook to enjoin the conveyance of said lwspital property 
in accordance ;with the aforesaid contract, that after due legal 
proceeding· the temporary injunction restraining the sale of 
said hospital was dissolved, and 'the Virginia Trust Company, 
Executor of Dr. Ra,vley H. Fuller., deceased, in accordance 
with the aforesaid contract, executed and delivered a good 
and sufficient deed to the said South Boston Hospital to 
Tucker C. Watkins, Jr., and Dr. I. K. Brig-gs, a copy of which 
is hereto attached as aforesaid; that upon receipt of the afore-
said deed these respondents paid the full consideration of 
$40,000.00 to the Executor of Dr. Rawley I-I. Fuller with the 
understanding that said sum would be earmarked pending 
the determination of the election of Corrie A. Fuller between 
her jointure, bequest, and dower in the real estate of said Dr. 
Rawley I-I. Fuller, deceased. 
These respondents allege that as a matter of equity and 
good conscience they purchased the South Boston Hospital 
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apd paid full value therefor and were without fa ult of their 
own placed in a position where they could not refuse their 
purchase or release the Executor therefrom, and since there 
is available property belonging to the estate of Dr. Rawley 
H. Fuller from which dower can be assigned, should the widow 
elect to surrender her jointure and take dower., that the South 
Boston Hospital should be released from the payment by way 
of dower or rent to the said Corrie A. Fuller. 
These respondents further allege that should the said Cor-
rie A. Fuller be assigned dower in the South Boston Hospital 
real estate that it would then become necessarv for the court 
to determine and decre.e the portion of the ~id $40,000.00 
which was paid for the real estate and which portion was 
· paid for the personalty, and that in the aforesaid event these 
respondents are entitled to have set aside and in-
page 51 ~ vested for the benefit of Corrie A. Fuller one-third 
of the proportion of said sum representing said 
real estate, and to have the income and profits therefrom dur-
ing the life of the said Corrie A. Fuller paid over to her as a 
credit on her dower in said hospital real estate. 
And now having fuller answered these combined suits, these 
respondents pray to be hence dismissed with their reasonable 
costs on this behalf expended. 
TUCKER C. \VATKINS, JR. 
Respondent 
DR. I. K. BRIGGS 
Respondent 
( By counsel) 
HENRY W. McLAUGHLIN, JR., and 
TUCK & MITCHELL, Attorneys, 
South Boston, Va . ., p. q. 
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August 7, 1943 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor 
under the will of Rawley H. Fuller 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Dear Sirs: 
I hereby offer you $40,000.00, payable as hereafter dated,. 
for the property in the town of South Boston, Virginia, known 
as South Boston Hospital, owned and operated by the late 
Rawley H. Fuller., M. D., and its equipment, etc. 
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. The subject matter of this offer is the aforesaid hospital 
building and the lot of land owned and used in connection 
with it, fronting approximately 86 ft. on :Main Street, running 
back to an alley in the rear and adjoining land of :Mrs. H. B. 
Gates, together with all furniture, furnishings, equipment, 
surgical and medical instruments and the like, and all sup-
plies and materials, both consumable and otherwise, owned 
by the late Rawley H. Fuller and contained in this building, 
and any and all rights and privileges for the operation of 
such hospital, likewise owned by Rawley H. Fuller and capable 
of being transferred; this offer being· made for the said hos-
pital and every right therein owned by Dr. Fuller, as a going 
proposition. 
·. I agree to pay the purchase price as follows: $20,000. in 
cash; balance by notes secured by purchase money deed of 
trust, maturing· $1,000.00 semi-annually for the first two years, 
and $2,000.00 semi-annually thereafter until paid in full, with 
interest at 5% per annum, payable semi-annually. 
It is understood that certain repairs and improvements 
to an X-ray machine were authorized by Dr. Fuller prior to 
his death, to cost approximately $1,200.00. I agree to advise 
you within five days of acceptance of this offer 
page 53 ~ whether I wish to accept these improvements., in 
which event I will pay for them; otherwise you 
may cancel the order for them . 
.Actual possession of the property to be g·iven as of date of 
settlement, which shall be as soon as my attorney has had op-
portunity to examine the title, upon delivery of Special "\Var-: 
ranty deed to T. C. Watkins, Jr., and I. K. Briggs, or whom-
ever they may designate; taxes and fire insurance to be pro-
rated as of date of settlement. 
It is understood that all obligations incurred in the opera-
tion of the hospital by you, pending settlement of this sale, 
will be paid by you; and that any patien~s no,;V there may stay 
so long as necessary to complete their treatment. 
This offer is to be accepted or rejected witliin one day from 
date. 
It is contemplated that a corporation may be f<;mned to take 
title to this property; in any event, the first maturing $10,-
000.00 purchase money notes will be individually endorsed by 
T. C. ·watkins, Jr.; furthermore., I agree until the entire in-
debtedness is paid there shall be no dividends paid, stock re- .. 
tired or withdrawals of anv kihcl bv the stockholders. Also, 
it ,is our intention to contfnue the ·operation of the hospitai 
substantially as at present, and witl1 respect to any patients 
who may be there at the time it is turned over to us, I will see 
that they are accorded such treatment and hospital facilities 
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as they. may then be receiving·, and wiil relieve you of any 
responsibility to tLem for the shme. 
I berelJy tendei" you the sum of $1,000.00. to bind this con-
tract; sarilC to be applied to the pui·ehase price if this offer is 
accepted, otherwise to be immediately rehfrned to me. 
Youi·s very tmly, 
T. C. ,v ATKINS; JR. 
L Aug. 7., 1943 
The above offer hereby accepted 
VIRGINIA TRUST COMP ANY, 
Exocutoi· Rawley H. Fuller Estate 
By: F. A. ,v ADDELL, Assistant Treasurer 
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v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et als. 
OPINION ON DE:\IURRER FILED BY CORRIE A. FUL-
LER TO THE BILL OF OO)IPLAINT. 
I think it too plain to admit of argument that the construc-
t.ioll ph1eod upon a statute by the court of last resort of the 
state by which it was enacted is what the statute is. There-
fore the construction g·iven Sectjon 5120 of our Code by the 
SujJl'eme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the case of Mc-
- Donald v. McDonald, 169 Va. 752, fixes the meaning of it at 
the time the deed from l\foCanless to Mrs. Fuller was de-
livered. So much, i gather, is admitted by the demurrant, but 
her arg·ument goes to the point that the statute as amended 
and in effect at the date of her husband's death controls and 
not the one in effect at the time the deed was· delivered, the 
conclusion that to sustain this contention would give the stat-
ute retrospective effect scorns inescapable. 
There is no need to depart from a course, well defined by 
rules of statutory constructio11., into the wide fields of consti-
tutional law to reach this opinion. The rule is too well estab-
lished, that unless it clearly appears to the contrary, that all 
statutes ai·e to be taken as applying prospectively. And this 
general rule of construction has been made s~atutory with 
us bv Section 6 of our Code. Southworth v. Su.llfoan, 162 Va. 
H25 ;· Ferguson v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77; • Boggs: v. Fa,tlierley, 
177 Va. 259. 
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The question prese1ited by the distii1ction between substan-
tive and adjective, or procedural law only arises in cases in-
volving the claimed impairnieilt of vested rig;hts. it is a 
question of legislative power-not of legislative intent, or 
judicial Mnstructibh. 
As I understand it, demurrant concedes that the meaning of 
a statute is that which the courts have given it; 
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a tei'iri thei·cof tµe statutory law applicable iri e;x-
istence when they were ii1ade or ~ntei~ed into. If ,no.t, the law 
is. plainly_ settled to that effect. Jlfi,,wes v. Wm. R. Trigg 09., 
110 Va. 265; Union Ce1itrcil Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. 
164; Maxey v . .America,n Gas Co., 190 Va. 285. But she bases 
her demurret upon the i)roposition that the status of husband 
and wife under Sections 5120 and 5121 of the Code; and the 
respective rights and incidents created by and arising from 
the deed in question, do 110t, so far as jointtire and dower are 
concerned, come into play at all until the husband's death. 
This argument merely takes us back to the question of what 
is retrospective legisl~tibi1? 
In Section 641 of Lewis' Sutherland Statutorv Construc-
tion, 2nd Ed., retrospective statutes, it is said, reiate to past 
acts and transactions. Section 6 of the Code seems to me to 
make the same classi:ffoatio:n and to provide. a complete an-
swer. Having the l\foCanless property deeded to bis wife was 
a past transaction when the amendment of Section 5120 be-
came effective. It was true, of course., that some of the rights 
attached to that transaction by the law of Virginia could not 
be finally exercised or determined until tbe husband's death, 
but the rights arose when the deed was delivered. In effect 
a fee simple .estate upon condition was created in the wife. 
The condition being- tlmt if after her husband's death the 
widow claimed her dower her fee simple estate would cease. 
My firm opinion is that the demurrer must be overruled. 
April 20, 1944. 
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Respectfully, 
HENRY C. LEIGH, Judge 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County. 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor and Trustee 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller 
I 
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Mrs. Corrfo A. Fuller. 
Before Hon. Henry C. Leigh, Judge. 
Halifax, Virginia, June 13th, 1944. 
OPENING STATEMENT. 
Mr. Randolph Tucker: '' If the Court please~ as I under-. 
stand it, the hearing today is confined to the question of 
whether or not provision made by Dr. Fuller by his l\foCan-
less deed in l\Iay, 1938, and by the provisions of his will for 
his wife, created jointure, and that" is the sole question for 
the Court today. In the absence of the bill itself, I have a 
carbon copy of the bill here, and I would like to read the Court 
the eighth paragraph of that bill. 
'·'The eighth paragraph of the bill reads as follows: (At 
this point, Mr. Tucker read from the copy of the bill the eighth 
paragraph of same.) 
'' The answer to that paragraph of the bill by Mrs. Fuller is 
as follows: (At this point, Mr. Tucker read from tl1e answer 
filed therein.) 
"Now, if Your Honor pleases, on those pleadings the facts 
I think are admitted in the answer, the essential facts. It be-
comes a question of law of intention. We rest upon the pre-
sumption created by the Statute., Section 5120, that in the ab-
sence of a distinct indication in the McCanless deed, or in 
some other writing, that the conveyance ·was not intended as 
jointure and in lieu of dower, that the widow is bound, and 
we stand upon that presumption, and think that the burden 
of going forward with the evidence rests upon the other 
side.'' · 
page 57 ~ MRS. CORRIE A. FULLER, 
a witness of lawful· ag·e, called on her own behalf, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Easley: . 
Q. Mrs. Fuller, you are Corrie Allen Fuller, the widow of 
Dr. R. H. Fuller? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did your husband, Dr. Fuller, give to you the home that 
you are now living in, which is generaily described as the Mc-
Canless home °l 
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Mrs. Corrie .A. Fuller . 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·wm you state to the Court the circumstances under 
which that g·ift was made! 
:Mr. Tucker: vVe object at the outset to any evidence what-
ever relating to the gift as being· a gift which would not come 
within the provisions of that statute requiring the gift to 
be in evidence either by the deed itself or by some other writ-
ing. 
Judge: ·what was your question., Mr. Easley? 
Q. Will you state to the Court the circumstances under 
which that gift was made? 
Mr. Easley: I propose to prove by her his intention as" 
stated to her. 
Judge: I don't think it's ordinarily admissible, but in a 
case of this sort, the Court is always in an embarrassing posi-
tion, or probably not as embarrassing as it would be, should 
the Jury be trying it. I don't see I].mch use in eliminating evi-
dence, if there is any possible question about it. Sometimes I 
do not think the Court can consider the evidence, but the Plain-
tiff would have a right to put it in the record, and that would 
probably be the position of the Court. Go ahead with it. 
Mr. Tucker: That is very ordinarily correct, but where the 
statute is so plain., as it is here-
Judge: Well, suppose these gentlemen advance the argu-
ment that they would like to except the Court's ruling. I am 
frank to say I do not think the Court should exclude the testi-
mony. 
1.lfrs. Easley: Repeat the question please. 
Q. vVill you state to the· Court the circumstances under 
which that gift was made? 
page 58 ~ A. He gave it to me as a birthday gift. He 
asked me before my birthday what I wanted. I 
never cared for jewelry and things like that., and I told him I 
wanted it, and when he gave me the deed he said "Here's 
your birthday present.'' My mother was there in the room 
with us when he gave it to me. 
Q. Mrs. Fuller, you, I believe, executed a note and deed of 
trust at· the time the transaction was closed Y 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Did he ever make any statement to you at any time to 
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Mrs. Corrie A~ Fuller. 
the effect that this home ,ms given you in lieu of your dower 
interest in bis property'? 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Ttii'nbull: Your Honor; you understand that our ob-
jection continues? 
Judge: Yes, sir, you may move to strike it out if you 
·wish. 
CROSS EXAl\HNATION. 
By l\Ir. Tucker, of counsel for complainant, who maintaining· 
his objection, and without waiving; same, cross examined 
the witness as follows: 
• Q. :Mrs. Fuller, the deed to you from Mr. McCanless and 
his wife recites that Mr. McCanless was paid the sum of eight 
thousai1d five hundred dollars in cash. That was true, was 
it not? 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. Do jrou undertake to deny the recital of the deed? 
A. I understood that there was a cash payment made, and 
then paid in monthly p·ayments. 
Q. Didn't this lrnppen: Mr. 1\fcCanless was paid in full 
eight thousand five hundred dollars and then Dr. Fuller bo'i'-
ro,,1ed from a local loan association in South Boston about 
six thousand dollars, wbicl1 he actually paid out of-
A. Since Dr. Fuller g·ave me the home as a gift, he didn't 
tell me exactly how he paid for it. 
Q. Do you know anything at all abo·ut the financial arrange-
ments of this transaction? 
A. I know very little about :financial arrangements of any 
kind. 
,Judg·e: :Mrs.- Fuller, you did not out of any funds that 
came into your possession make any of the payments 1 
A. No, Dr. Fuller gave me the house as a birthday gift. 
,Judge: I understand that., but it has been put in the evi-
. dence that you signed the note. After you signed 
page 59 ~ it, you had nothing to do with the installments paid 
on the n·ote? · 
A. No. 
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:MISS CARRIE Vi!OLTZ, 
a witness of lawful age; called on behalf of Mrs. Fuller, testi-
fied as follows : 
DiRECT EJXAMiN:A.TION; 
By Mr. Meade: 
Mr. Tucker: For the i·ecoi·d, i move to exclude this evi-
dence. 
Mr. Meade: If the Ccmrt is not passing on it, I wish to 
make exception then. 
Q. You are Miss Carrie Woltz 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vliere are you now employed? 
A. Danville Community Hospital. 
Q. In wlrnt capacity? 
A. As a dietitian. 
Q. Were you employed by Dr. Fuller at the South Boston 
Hospital at the time of his ·aeath f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How lo'ng had yo11 worked with Dr. Fuller? 
A. Twenty years. 
Q. "\Vere you with him at his hospital at Clover before he 
moved to South Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you continue in his. employment from th~ time 
he moved to South Boston up until the time of his death Y 
A. I did. 
Q. In what capacity were you employed at the South Boston 
Hospital 1 
A. Dietitian. _ 
Q. Did you see Dr. Fuller quite freqU(mtlyf 
A. Yes, very often. . . 
vage 60 ~ Q. Do you recall an occasion on which he had a 
conversation with yo1i in regard to the Washing-
ton Street residence property of Mrs. Fuller? 
A. I do. 
Q. Will you tell the Court in your own words just briefly 
what that was. 
Mr. Tucker: We make the same objection and exception. 
A. Well, he came in very happy and told. me that he was 
giving this home to his wife as a birthday gift . 
• 
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R. A. Leggett. 
Q. Do you remember when .that was? 
A. It was around 1'938 as well as I remember. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
of Mrs. Fuller 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. What is your birthday, Mrs. Fuller? 
A. May 28th. 
Mr. Tucker~ We move to exclude the evidence of Miss 
Woltz. 
MR. R. A. LEGGETT, 
a witness of lawful age, called on behalf of :Mrs. Fuller, testi-
fied as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. Mr. Leg·g·ett., you live in South Boston f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the Manager of Leggett's Department Store°l 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know Dr. Fuller quite well T 
A. I knew Dr. Fuller well. 
Q. And you and he visited each other frequentlyf 
A. Very frequently. 
Q. Mr. Leg·gett, did Dr. Fuller ever make any statement in 
your presence as to the gift of the McCanless home to bis 
wife? 
Mr. Tucker: We will make the same objection. 
A. He did on several occasions. 
Q. What did he say! 
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tion to Mrs. Fuller on several occasions-at my ) 
home and at the hospital also. I went to his office and he 
told me he had ·given it to her, and he mentioned it several 
times at my home also. 
Q. I don't suppose you could remember the dates? 
A. It was around the latter part of 1938 or 1939, and of 
course later on. I reckon, well, a year before he died he 
brought the question up again that he had given it to her. _ 
Mr. Tucker : We move to exclude the evidence. 
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MR. HUGH VAUGHAN,, 
a witness of lawful age, called on behalf of Mrs. Fuller, testi-
fied as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. Mr. Vaughan, you live in South Boston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you iu May, 1938, the representative of the South 
Boston Federal Savings Association? 
A. Yes, Secretary and Treasurer. 
Q. Did Dr. Fuller negotiate a loan through your Company 
in May, 1938! 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. For what amount of money? 
A.. Six thousand dollars. 
Q. On what date? 
A. May 28th, 1938. 
Q. And what was done with that six thousand dollars? 
A. It was paid to W. A. l\foCanless, Jr. as a payment on the 
purchase of a home. 
Q. The check was directly to W. A. McCanless, Jr.? 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. That note I believe was sig·ned by Mrs. Fuller and Dr. 
Fuller. Is that righU 
A. That's right. 
Q. It was an installment note 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
pag·e 62 ~ Q. And the note was dated May 28th, 1938, is 
that correct 1 
A. I can't say. It may have been ahead of this check. 
Q. Is there any objection to my reading the date of the 
note from this book! (Deed Book) (No objection) The deed 
of trust was dated May 27th, 1938, and states in this deed of 
trust that the note bore even date with the deed of trust. That 
would be corr.ect, Mr. Vaughan? 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. And it was payable in installments of how much? 
A. $67.78. 
Q. When was the first payment made 7 
A. July 5th, 1938. 
Q. And when was the last payment made? 
A. May 4th, 1942. 
Q. Wben was the second payment made? 
A. August 4th, 1938. 
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Q. And every one of those payments was $67 .78 7 
.l\ .. That's right. 
Q. ,v as the payment of the debt anticipated 1 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. How much was the last installment? 
A. The last installment was made May 4th, 1942., and was 
in the amount of $1,529.71. 
Q. Mr. Vaughan, you have before you the original card that 
recorded the payments? 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. As I understand it, all the payments on this obligation 
were made subsequent to July 22nd, 1938. 
A. Yes. 
Q. All except the first payment of $67 .78 f 
A. That's right . 
. Judge: "\Vi th whom were your negotiations with for this 
loan? 
A. ·with Dr. Fuller. 
page 63 ~ Judge : Now as I understand it, the note was 
sig·ned· by Mrs. Fuller and Dr. Fuller1 
A. That's right. 
Judge: And as far as you know; who made the payments!' 
. A. As far as I know, they ,~,.ere made by Dr. Fuller. 
Judge : As far as your dealings were concerned, Mrs. Ful-
ler came into the picture only because it was a matter of 
form! 
A. Yes, they require both signatures. 
Judge: But all of your negotiations were made with Dr. 
Fuller? 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. Mr. Vaughan., when the debt was satisfied, what became 
of the original note and deed of trust 1 
A. They were returned to Dr. Fuller~ 
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Mr. Tucker: I have made a search for that note, and have 
not found it. I don't think we have the deed of trust here. 
Mr. Easley: If there is no objection, I would like to read 
the dates. I don't see any need to read the whole deed, for 
it is agree-a that this deed of trust as recorded in that book 
shall become a part of the record. 
( Counsel on both sides agree as follows:) 
AgTeed by the parties that the deed of trust involving the 
l\foCanless home will be copied into the record; that the deed 
from Wm. A. l\.foCanless, Jr. to Corrie A. Fuller conveying 
this property was recorded in Deed Book 157, page 199, and 
was admitted to record on May 28th, 1938; and that the deed 
of trust from Corrie A. Fuller and R.H. Fuller, her husband, 
to F. L. McKinney, Trustee., was recorded in Deed Book 157, 
page 200, on May 28th, 1938; and that the deed of trust will 
be copied into the record. 
I, Henry C.. Leigh, Judge designated to preside at the trial 
of the chancery cause of Virginia Trust Company, Executor, 
&c., v. Corrie .A.. Fuller, et als., pending in the Circuit Court 
of Halifax County,, do hereby certify that the foregoing testi-
mony, ore tenus, before me on June 13th, 1944, is all the evi-
dence that has been introduced in this cause. Same is hereby 
made a part of the record. 
Teste: This 29th day of June, 1944. 
HENRY C. LEIGH, Judge. 
page 64 ~ CORRIE .A.. FULLER &C TO FRANK L. Mc-
KINNEY, TRUSTEE D. TR. $6,000. DEED 
BOOK, 157, P .AGE 200. 
THIS DEED Made this 27th day of May,, 1938, between 
Corrie A. Fuller and R. H. Fuller, her husband, of South 
Boston, Va., parties of the first part, and Frank L. McKinney, 
Trustee for the First Federal Saving·s & Loan Association of 
South Boston, Va., party of the second part, WITNESSETH: 
That in consideration of the sum of $5.00 in hand paid, re-
ceipt whereof is hereby acknowledged., the said parties of the 
first part do grant and convey unto the party of the second 
part, with g·eneral warranty, the following property, to-wit: 
All that certain lot or parcel of land, with improvements 
thereon lying in the town of South Boston, Halifax County, 
Va., on the east ·side of Washington Street, and designated as 
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Lot No. 10 on the plat of the Joseph Stebbins property which 
plat is recorded in Plat Book 1,·page 122; said lot fronting 50 
feet on \V' ashing-ton Street and extending back 162.8 feet 011 
the north side and 161.4 feet on the south side and being the 
same lot conveyed to the said Corrie A. Fuller by \Villiam A. 
McCanless and wife by deed dated May 19, 1938., and recorded 
along with this deed. IN TRUST, however, to secure to the 
holder of the hereinafter .described note the payment of the: 
sum of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) with interest thereon 
at the rate of 6% per annum, as evidenced by one certain 
negotiable.note of even.date with this deed, drawn by the said 
parties of the first pa1·t for the sum of $6,000.00 and interest 
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, payable to the order 
of the Fir-st Federal Savings & Loan Association of South 
Boston, Va., in monthly installments of $67.78 on the first 
day of each calendar month hereafter until under the terms 
of the note the indebtedness thereby is completely paid. 
Identified by trustee's signature. Renewal or extension per-
mitted. Right of anticipation reserved. Subject to all upon 
default. Exemption waived. Insurance required. 
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State of Virginia., 
County of Halifax, to-wit: 
CORRIE A. FULLER (Seal) 
R. H. FULLER (Seal) 
I, C. E. Bass, a Notary Public of and for the county and 
state aforesaid, do certify that Corrie A. Fuller and R. H. 
Fuller, her husband, whose names are signed to the foregoing 
writing, bearing date on the 27 day of May, 1938, have ac-
knowledged the same before me in my county aforesaid. Given 
under my hand this the 27th day of May, 1938. 
C. E. BASS .. 
Notary Publte 
C. E. BASS, 
Notary Public, Halifax County, Virginia. 
My commission expires 7 /24/39. 
The within written deed was presented in the Clerk's Of-
fice of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, Virginia, on .the 
28 day of May, 1938, at 11 :15 o'clock .A. :M:., a.nd upon the cer-
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ti:ficate of acknowledgment thereon endorsed admitted to rec-
ord according· to law. 
E. C. LACY, Clerk 
(Memoranda on margin of foregoing Deed of Trust) 
The note secured in this deed of trust has this day been 
produced before me marked paid and duly cancelled. Given 
under my hand this 8th day of May, 1942. 
JAS. H. :MEDLEY., D. Clerk 
The debt secured by this deed of trust has been paid in full 
and the lien of this deed is here by released and discharged. 
Given under my hand this 8th day of May, 1942. 
FIRST FED. SAVINGS & LOAN ... t\.SSO-
CIATION OF SO. BOSTON 
By: FRANK L. :McKINNEY, Attorney 
Teste: JAS. H. MEDLEY, D. C. 
page 66 ~ And at another day, at the day first herein men-
tioned the following decree was entered, which is 
in the following· words and figures, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Halifax County, June 19th, 1944 
Virginia Trust Company, Executor, Plaintiff 
v. 
Corrie A. Fuller, et al., Defendants 
THIS CAUSE, in which evidence was beard ore tertus on 
June 13, 1944, came on this day to be heard on the papers 
formerly read, and was argued by counsel. On consideration 
whereof, the court is of opinion, and doth so bold, that all 
verbal declarations and statements bv Dr. R. H. Fuller as to 
his intentions in connection with the property be had CO!).--
veyed to Mrs. Corrie A. Fuller, his wife, by ,vmiam A. Mc-
Canless, Jr. and wife by deed dated May 19., 1938, are inad-
missible, and should be excluded from the record, subject to 
the exception of counsel for Corrie A. Fuller which has been 
duly taken but that the testimony relating to the payment bv 
Dr. Fuller qf the deferred purchase money is material and 
admissible, and that the transcript of the testimony taken on 
June 13th should be prepared and thereupon certified bv the 
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Coud and filed as a part of the record in this suit. The court 
is further of opinion, and doth so adjudge, order and decree, 
that the said deed from "\Villiam l\ .. McCanless, Jr. and wife 
to Corrie A. Fuller, dated :May 19, 1938., conveying to Mrs. 
Fuller the residential property on the east side of Washington 
Street, in the Town of South Boston, Halifax County, Vir-
ginia, constitutes jointure, and that, since the said Corrie A. 
li,uller has renounced the last will and testament of Dr. Ful-
ler and laid claim to dower in all the real estate owned bv 
him, the said residei1tial property reverts in law to the es-
tate of the said Fuller., and the said Corrie A. Fuller, within 
fifteen clays from the entry of this decree, is directed to con-
vey the said property, which is fully described in the bill of 
complaint, to the Virginia Trust Company, Executor of R. H. 
Fuller, by deed with special warranty of title, and, 
page 67 ~ in the event of her failure or refusal to do so within 
, said period of time, Vv. B. Settle, who is hereby 
appointed commissioner for that purpose, is directed to con-
vey the said property to the Virginia Trust Company,, Execu-
tor of R. H. Fuller, deceased, by deed with special warranty 
of title. Counsel for Corrie A. Fuller having expressed their 
intention to prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court of 
.Appeals of Virginia, the court doth reserve decision on all 
other matters of controversy or litigation in this suit until 
some further day, and doth order that the operation of this 
decree be suspended for a period of ninety days, for the pur-
pose of enabling· counsel for Mrs. Fuller to present an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals, upon the ex~cution of a bond by Mrs. 
Fuller, or someone for her, in the penalty of $600.00, within 
ten days from the entry of this decree, conditioned according 
to law, and with surety approved by the Clerk. 
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County of Halifax: 
In the Clerk's Office of said Court; 
I, E. C. Lacy, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax County, 
Yirginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true tran-
soript of the record .of the suit of Virginia Trust Company, 
Executor of Rawley H. Fuller 'V. Corrie A. Fuller, &c. 
Given under my hand this the 7th day of July, 1944. 
Fee $40.00. 
E. C. LACY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax 
County, Va. 
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Virginia; 
In the Clerk's Office of Halifax County Circuit Court; 
I., E. C. Lacy, Clerk of the Circuit Court in the County of 
Halifax, Virginia, do hereby certify that a notice has been 
given as required by law of the defendants' intention to apply 
for this transcript, and that a bond in the penalty of $600.00 
,vith good security was given on June 21st, 1944. 
Given under my hand this 7th day of July, 1944. 
E. C. LACY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Halifax 
County, Virginia. 
A. Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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